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PROPERTY AND SUPPORT RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS: A PROPOSAL FOR CREATING
A NEW LEGAL STATUS
William A. Reppy, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States in the mid-1980's millions of couples, consisting
of a man and a woman involved in a sexual relationship, live together
although unmarried to each other.' At the termination of the cohabita-
tion relationship-either by death or by simply the parting of ways-the
courts are asked to declare what, if any, support, property, or contract
rights one cohabitant has against the other (or the estate of a deceased
cohabitant).
The problem of how cohabitants fit into the legal framework can also
arise at a time when the relationship is ongoing and stable, not through
claims of the cohabitants inter se but usually through disputes with third
parties. For example, one of the cohabitants may seek recovery for loss
of consortium from a tortfeasor who injured the other cohabitant.2 A
creditor of one of the pair may seek to recover from earnings of the other
cohabitant during their relationship on the theory that it is the legal
equivalent of community property.3
This article reviews critically American law's initial treatment of the
cohabiting couple, the recognition of what can be called a negative status
which, rather than create rights and obligations between the cohabitants,
disabled them from making contracts with each other and in some jurisdic-
tions barred certain types of donations by one to the other.
A majority of jurisdictions seem to have abandoned the negative status
approach and have employed contract law to determine the property-related
rights of cohabitants. This article notes the uncertainties of this contract-
law approach and the difficulty of meshing into federal law of taxation
and bankruptcy the position of domestic partners who lack a status
relationship.
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Member of the California and North Carolina
bars.
1. See, e.g., Presnick, Who Gets the Apartment When Unmarried People Uncouple,
4 Fairshare No. 2, p. 9 (Feb. 1984); Weitzman, Changing Families, Changing Laws, 5 Fam.
Advoc. 2 (Summer 1982); Note, The Rights of Unmarried Cohabiting Couples to Housing
in New York, I1 Fordham Urb. L.J. 381, 383-84 (1982). See also authorities cited infra
note 19.
2. See infra note 108.
3. See Mintz & Mintz, Inc. v. Color, 250 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Sims
v. Matassa, 200 So. 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941); Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d
838, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
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The article concludes that the negative-status approach must be re-
jected as based on outdated social mores and inaccurate notions as to
the power of domestic relations law to alter contemporary lifestyles. While
cohabitants certainly ought to be free to make express contracts with each
other concerning property and support rights and obligations, contract
law cannot provide adequate solutions to the problems raised by the large
number of cohabiting couples.
It is recommended that these problems be approached primarily
through status law. The common-law marriage doctrine should be revived
in states that once recognized it but abolished it; it should be embraced
for the first time in states like Louisiana where it never had a foothold.
At the least the civil law's putative marriage doctrine should be expanded
to cases where there was no civil or religious ceremony yet the cohabitants
believed they were married under the rejected common-law marriage
doctrine.
Finally, the major thrust of the article is the somewhat novel sugges-
tion that legislation be enacted to create a new status-lawful
cohabitation-with rules concerning support, property and associated rights
and obligations corresponding to the expectations of typical cohabitants.
It is proposed that cohabitants be able to formally enter this status by
official recordation (or even a ceremony) but that, in addition, a doctrine
which can be called common-law cohabitation be recognized where the
acts of the couple in entering into the relationship can-cause the status
to attach.
It is hoped that the federal government will, in applying taxation,
bankruptcy, and some aspects of social security law, accept the state-law
theory that lawful cohabitation status is a new form of marriage. If this
marriage theory is rejected, Congressional action recognizing the new status
will be necessary to make the proposal wholly workable.
I. COHABITATION AS CREATING A NEGATIVE STATUS
American law initially responded to cohabitation by creating a status
for the cohabitants.4 Although the status entered Louisiana law legislatively
in the Civil Code of 1808 with a codal article restricting donations be-
4. See Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect Union,
26 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1980). She notes that the relationship is status because rules of
law apply to it not through recognition of a civil contract between the parties but because
their actions have brought them within the legal category of concubinage. This result, she
notes, "deprives unwed cohabitors of the right to contract concerning some of their most
personal effects." Id. at 11. See also Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment:
From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 47 (1978); Hunter, An
Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 Va. L.
Rev. 1039, 1091 (1978).
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tween cohabitants,' in the great majority of jurisdictions this status was
the product of common law, judge-made rules. Given various names-
concubinage, meretricious relationship, illicit cohabitation-the status was
unique in law. It initially conferred no rights at all on the parties (whom
we shall refer to hereafter as CM for cohabiting man and CW for
cohabiting woman). Rather, the rules of law attaching because of the status
were negative, the primary one being an incapacity to make contracts with
each other, contracts that in many states would have been permissible
for persons living together in a nonsexual relationship. 6 As noted, in at
least one state, Louisiana, an additional disability attached to some
cohabitants in that many donations by one to the other were prohibited. 7
The reasons for this negative-status approach to cohabitation seem
to be several. First, the courts felt it an appropriate judicial function to
condemn and punish the cohabitants for their immorality in engaging in
sexual relations without the benefit of marriage.8 Since in years past
cohabitants were usually persons of lower socio-economic strata,' the
judicial attitude may reflect not only a moral smugness but a social and
economic one as well. Certainly, that few "proper" people cohabited
without marriage must have been a factor underlying the harsh judicial
attitude. Condemnation through criminal law (i.e., statutes making for-
nication a crime) might alter the parties' conduct and may have also been
part of the reasoning which lead to adoption of the negative status ap-
proach to cohabitation. 0
A second policy factor that appears in some older cohabitation cases
5. See present article 1481 of the Civil Code. Lorio, supra note 4, has collected cases
distinguishing open concubinage, to which the bar on some donations applies, from clandestine
concubinage, as to which no code article restricts the right of a cohabitant to make dona-
tions to the other.
6. The kind of contract between cohabitants most frequently held invalid is a pooling
of gains during the union, especially when only one of the pair is employed (or both have
separate jobs and one makes considerably more than the other). See, e.g., Succession of
Batiste, 446 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So.
2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983). While it would be unusual to find persons pooling gains
not to be involved in a sexual arrangement, the writer can imagine no basis for invalidating
a pooling of gains where, for example, three unmarried sisters live together with sporadic
employment for each.
7. Article 1481 of the Louisiana Civil Code has since 1808 barred donations of im-
movables by one cohabitant to the other and limited donations of movables to 100o of
the donor's estate. Oddly, the disability attaches only if the cohabitation (concubinage) is
"open." Clandestine cohabitants can freely make gifts to each other.
8. See Rochelle v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306, 307 (1860) (stating that cohabitation
is "repugnant to good morals"); Succession of Batiste, 145 So. 2d 668, 669 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) (condemning those who would "brazenly flout" the "moral fabric of society").
9. See Skolnick, The Social Contexts of Cohabitation, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 339, 341
(1981).
10. See Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
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from southern states' '  is separation of the races. Since
now-unconstitutional" miscegenation statutes prohibited racially mixed
couples from marriage, a status law that made cohabitation unattractive
was felt necessary to discourage evasion of the bar to lawful marriage
by entry in a de facto marriage. The notion that negative-status would
deter what was considered wrongful conduct was present also when the
cohabitants were of the same race.3
Thirdly, the negative-status approach is defended on the ground that
it is necessary to protect the institution of marriage." That is, to recognize
any of the benefits of marriage as accruing to a mere cohabitant would
denigrate the lawful status of marriage. When, as in a recent Louisiana
decision,'" this explanation for the negative-status approach is invoked
to incapacitate cohabitants from entering into a contract for the pooling
of gains acquired during the union, the situation is somewhat ironic. In-
capacity to contract inter se as to the marital rights and obligations of
the parties was one of the historic attributes of lawful marital status in
Louisiana' 6 as well as in many common law states that only recently has
begun to fall into some disfavor.' 7 Thus, the way in which marriage is
"protected" by holding cohabitants to lack capacity to contract inter se
is preventing cohabitation from being an attractive alternative lifestyle to
marriage because of greater freedom for the parties involved.
Criticism of the Negative-Status Approach
Under contemporary social conditions, none of the reasons given in
support of the negative-status approach is sound. The arm of the law
primarily concerned with meting out punishment to persons based on their
illicit sexual conduct is the legislative branch, and the trend there is to
repeal laws criminalizing sexual conduct between consenting adults of the
opposite sex.' 8
11. See Grant v. Butt, 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689 (1941). Religious discrimination
also appears in some cases taking the negative-status approach. See Regina v. Coffin, 19
Canadian Rptr. 22, 224 (Que. Q.B. 1954), where the judge said that to recognize a non-
marital union as equivalent to marriage would be an "outrage against .. .Christian morality."
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. See Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
14. See, e.g., Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
15. See id.
16. See La. Civ. Code art. 2446 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 17 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ.
Code.
17. See infra note 26.
18. See In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1967); State v.
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A
Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12 Willamette L.J. 453, 458
(1976); Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va. L. Rev.
663, 685 n.91 (1976); see also Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Sup-
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Moreover, the civil law cannot punish one of the cohabitants by de-
nying enforcement of at least an express agreement between the pair to
pool gains during their period of living together without rewarding the
other at the same time. In the reported cases it is usually CW, a stay-at-
home serving in the role of wife (and mother if there are children of
the union) who is "punished" under the negative-status approach. CM
has had title to acquisitions taken in his name despite a pooling contract
the parties had made; the law, in order to "punish" CW, permits CM
to freely walk away from his contract, doubling the amount of gain he
expected to have as his own if and when the parties split up.
In this circumstance, CW may be left impoverished and become a
burden on local welfare rolls or local charities who would otherwise devote
available funds to assist persons without any kind of resources. Especially
in the situation where CM has the wealth to honor his contract, which
would make CW self-sufficient, state interest is defeated by the attempt
through the negative-status approach to punish cohabitants for their
immorality.
The notion that the law should not give assistance to persons who
are "not our kind of people" (i.e., are of low socio-economic class) was
never and could not now be openly stated as a reason for employing the
negative-status approach to cohabitation. In any event, numerous studies
have shown that in recent years cohabitation has become a popular lifestyle
with middle and upper class persons9 (although these persons are not
port, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 359, 365-67 (1978) (contemporary law has no interest in punishing
cohabitants).
The change in mores respecting sexual conduct is legally recognized in many other situa-
tions. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984)
(holding that a fornicating female who contracted venereal disease may recover in tort from
male who assured her he did not have herpes when he knew he did); Barbara A. v. John
G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983) (holding that a fornicating female
who became pregnant can recover costs from male who falsely assured her he was sterile);
Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va. L. Rev. 663,
689 (1976) (analyzing cases where a custodial parent's entering into a cohabitation relation-
ship was held not to be a basis for change of custody).
19. L. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract 361-63 (1981); Beech, The Case Against Legal
Recognition of Cohabitation, in Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Society (M.
Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Marriage and Cohabitation]; Finlay,
The Informal Marriage in Anglo-Australian Law, in Marriage and Cohabitation, supra, 156,
159; Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17
U.C.D. L. Rev. 257, 261-62 (1983); Lorio, supra note 4, at 3, 23; Shultz, Contractual Ordering
of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 204, 287 (1982); Skolnick,
supra note 9, at 399, 443; Wand, The Relevance of Premarital Cohabitation to Property
Division Awards in Divorce Proceedings: An Evaluation of Present Trends and a Proposal
for Legislative Reform, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 105, 106 (1983); Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Mar-
riage: Formal and Informal Marriage in the United States, in Marriage and Cohabitation,
supra, 165, 169; Comment, Putative Spousal Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25
UCLA L. Rev. 96, 118 n.93 (1977).
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yet, apparently, a majority of cohabitants). Of course, a notion that con-
demnation of cohabitation will assist in keeping black and white people
from racially-mixed intimate association could not constitutionally serve
as a policy basis for employing the negative-status approach to cohabita-
tion after Loving v. Virginia.2"
Does judicial condemnation of cohabitation deter couples from engag-
ing in this form of domestic union? The writer is aware of no studies
comparing the rate of cohabitation in states that have rejected the negative-
status approach (such as California2 ' and Oregon22 ) with that in those
that cling to it (e.g., Louisiana23 and Illinois2"). Even before the much-
discussed 1976 Marvin5 decision, a large increase in the number of
cohabiting couples had been detected in California,26 yet at that time almost
all American jurisdictions took the negative-status approach to
cohabitation.
Moreover, although most persons with legal training or careers in
social work and related fields may have heard of Marvin, surely the ma-
jority of couples who began cohabitation since 1976 have not. The maxim
that all persons are deemed to know the law27 is, of course, only a fic-
tion. (If it were not, there would be no need for a specially trained bar.)
The writer concludes that it is not credible that an appellate court deci-
sion overruling the negative-status caselaw would cause any measurable
increase in the number of cohabiting couples.
The notion that the traditional approach actually deters cohabitation-
that is, decreases the number of cohabitants-depends not only on the
dubious assumption that persons considering cohabitation are aware of
the negative status rules that the law attaches because of such a living
arrangement, but also on the assumption that the couple may actually
rely on that state of the law as a reason not to cohabit. That latter assump-
tion also is not believable. Most couples who begin to cohabit probably
do not even think about making the kind of contracts that the negative-
status approach holds invalid.28 The very few who are aware of the
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
22. Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
23. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
24. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
25. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Bruch, Property Rights of de facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the
Value of a Homemaker's Services, 10 Fam. L.Q. 101, 103 (1976) (noting that judicial criticism
of the relationship as "illicit" does not deter cohabitants); Clark, The New Marriage, 12
Willamette L.J. 441, 442 (1976); Folberg & Buren, supra note 18, at 456 (1976); Glendon,
supra note 18, at 685.
27. See, e.g., Groseth v. Ness, 421 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1966); Abercrombie v. State, 91
Idaho 586, 428 P.2d 505 (1967); Millweight v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982).
28. See infra note 46.
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negative-status law and still wish to make a pooling-type contract may
often have sufficient faith in each other's commitment to the relationship
to rely on nonlegal enforcement mechanisms, such as mediation or simply
the dishonor among the cohabitants' peers of one who repudiates the legal-
ly unenforceable agreement.
There are probably also a small but significant number of cohabiting
couples of the rebellious type who consider this lifestyle in part for the
very reason that it is extra-legal.29 The few of them who are aware that
appellate decisions are labeling their unions illicit, meretricious or even
sinful could thus be encouraged to forego marriage.
In Louisiana-where the judiciary seems most committed to the pro-
position that the traditional or negative-status approach is necessary to
deter illicit conduct-legislation in 1982 seemed to accept the widespread
practice of cohabitation. Article 160 of the Civil Code was amended to
provide for termination of alimony when the recipient "enters into open
concubinage." 30
In sum, it is highly unlikely that judicial decisions (and a few statutes)
adopting the negative-status approach to cohabitation have any signifi-
cant impact on the decision of a couple to begin cohabiting. With respect
to those who are aware of this legal approach in the state where they
live, chances are as good that such a legal approach encourages rather
than discourages the practice.
It is urged that, wholly apart from deterrence, the law's permitting
mere cohabitants to obtain any of the benefits associated with legal
marriage-such as a contractual arrangement similar to a community of
acquets and gains-will demean and denigrate marriage.' This argument
is sound only if, as Justice Clark feared in his Marvin dissent,32 the rejec-
tion of the negative-status approach is accompanied by adoption of such
a large bundle of remedies for cohabitants that comparison of marriage
and cohabitation from the viewpoint of a domestic relations legal scholar
reveals cohabitation to be the preferable mode of sexual union from a
practical standpoint. (As noted above, the writer does not think conclu-
sions drawn from such a technical examination will have measurable ef-
29. See Glendon, supra note 18, at 687 n.100.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 160, as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 580, § I (applied in
Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)). Many other states are grap-
pling with the problem of whether entering into a cohabitation relationship should be a
ground for terminating alimony. See, e.g., In re marriage of Roofe, 460 N.E.2d 784 (1984);
Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1983).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
32. 18 Cal. 3d at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. See also Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 62, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1979) (criticizing Marvin for making
cohabitation more attractive than lawful marriage vis-d-vis remedies at dissolution); Schultz,
supra note 19, at 288 (expressing similar fears about rights of cohabitants under Marvin).
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fect on the numbers of people who elect cohabitation over marriage,
although it could over time as more persons learn about the actual govern-
ing law and as "moral" pressure to marry diminishes.)
The answer to this "denigration" argument is simply that the law
must heed Justice Clark's warning and not confect rules that make
cohabitation preferable to marriage. It should be noted that to adhere
to this goal, changes can be made on both sides of the balance. As legal
remedies are accorded to cohabitants, the law can, and should, remove
some of the strictures historically placed on married couples33 (such as
the incapacity to contract in advance of a falling out how property and
support claims will be handled in the event of divorce).
Note too, that even if one fears that recognition of the numerous
contractually-based remedies for cohabitants mentioned in Marvin will
denigrate marriage, that reservation probably cannot fairly be said about
the recognition of a new status of lawful cohabitation as recommended
in this article. The reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of this
status will be narrower than those attached to marital status.
The proposed new status for most cohabiting couples will fill a dif-
ferent function than does marriage. It will provide a legally sanctioned
mode of sexual union for those who have doubts about the life-long and
greater commitment of persons who elect to marry.
Moreover, is not marriage more demeaned (than it would be by
recognition of an additional and alternative status) by the law's attempt-
ing to force into it with a life-long commitment persons who desire a
heterosexual, monogamous lifestyle yet are uncertain about making the
33. The call for a very broad freedom of contract between the lawfully married-
including the right to make antenuptial agreements governing support obligations (if any)
and division of property at divorce-is widespread in recent legal literature. See, e.g., L.
Weitzman, supra note 19, at 227 & passim (1981); Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract:
Defining the Terms of Relationship, 8 Fam. L.Q. 27, 45-46 (1974); Glendon, Family Law
Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553 (1984); Schultz, supra note 19, at 229 & passim.
There is a strong trend in the case law favoring increased freedom of contract. See,
e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Osborne v. Osborne, 81 Mass. App.
Ct. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Frey v. Frey, 471 A.2d 705, (1984); Hafner
v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1980).
However, the recently promulgated (July 1983) Uniform Premarital Agreement Act limits
such freedom of contract by an "unconscionability" proviso (§ 6(a)), and a bar to waiving
support will keep a divorcing spouse from the welfare rolls (§ 6(b)). A very wishy-washy
provision (§ 7) says that if agreement is made in contemplation of marriage and the mar-
riage turns out to be invalid (i.e., the legal relationship was cohabitation), the contract is
enforced only to the extent necessary "to avoid an inequitable result." The writer thinks
the contractual arrangements for sharing of gains and the like should be presumptively bind-
ing whether or not the marriage was valid.
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life-long commitment?34 If, as the writer believes, the divorce rate would
substantially drop were the law to create a new status of lawful cohabita-
tion, surely the institution of marriage would be strengthened. Will not
the question "will you marry me?" be more meaningful to a loved-one
under a system of law where "let's be lawful cohabitants" is a sanction-
ed alternative?
Finally, the negative-status approach may be breeding contempt in
general for the law by former cohabitants harmed by application of this
theory. Almost every case of a cohabiting couple who agree to pool gains
in ignorance of the illegality of the contract is a prime candidate for
engendering such contempt. The pain of dashed expectations that the law
would provide some relief also attends the breakup of a couple who
assumed (erroneously) that something like a common-law marriage doc-
trine attached to at least a long-term cohabitation.
Where the law has little hope of advancing perceived morality by alter-
ing conduct, its best posture is to respond to typical expectations con-
cerning the impact of law in a particular situation.3" The writer does not
think the negative-status theory reflects such expectations.
II. ABANDONMENT OF NEGATIVE-STATUS IN FAVOR OF A
CONTRACT-LAw APPROACH
Most of the American jurisdictions adhering to the negative-status
approach to cohabitation would enforce a contract on which CW sued
CM or vice versa if it could be wholly severed from the illicit sexual
arrangement.36 This severance could most readily be found in situations
where the contract was wholly commercial-e.g., CW would work for
CM for agreed on wages as a nurse or cook-and was made before sex-
ual relationship began between the pair.37 Especially in Louisiana, parties
to a pooling-of-earnings contract have been unable to sever it from the
illicit sexual union when the agreement was not commercial in nature.3"
34. See Schultz, supra note 19, at 252; Skolnick, supra note 9, at 356 (arguing that
pluralism can be a positive value in the area of domestic relations).
35. See Glendon, supra note 18, at 692 (new forms of social conduct can and usually
should lead to creation of new law).
36. See generally Lorio, supra note 4. In addition to obtaining relief by severing from
this sexual relationship a contract by one cohabitant to perform services for the other, a
cohabitant can establish ownership of a fractional share of a jointly operated business "if
the concubine can furnish strict and conclusive proof that her capital and industry obtained
independent of the concubinage contributed" the full share that she claims at termination
of the relationship. Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 So. 2d 162 (La 1982).
37. See Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294 (1871); Delamour v. Roger, 7 La.
Ann. 152 (1852).
38. See Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966, 93 So. 2d 232 (1957); Simpson v. Normand,
1984] 1685
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And even commercial-type agreements made after the cohabitation com-
menced have usually been tainted by the illicit living arrangement. 9
Marvin authorizes an express agreement for a sharing of gains similar
to that under a community property regime, based on a pooling of ef-
forts in the classic noncommercial situation where one of the pair (CW
in Marvin, as in most such cases) was expected to give up work and be
a stay-at-home wife-equivalent. A kind of severance is required. It is not
fatal to such contracts that they are made after cohabitation begins; they
are enforceable "unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious
consideration." ' An express agreement for support that would create con-
tractual obligation similar to alimony would be similarly enforceable under
the Marvin theory, as would a contract giving the surviving cohabitant
upon termination of the arrangement by death-a claim against the other's
property similar to a nonbarrable share under common law statutory suc-
cession schemes (or a Louisiana widow's portion). 41
Subject to the same required severance from illicit taint, an implied
contract-at least for sharing of gains-would be recognized in jurisdic-
tions adhering to Marvin, and a quantum meruit claim for services
rendered nongratuitously could be asserted. 42 As a remedial device under
this contract approach, equitable remedies such as the resulting or con-
structive trust have been employed.
A number of jurisdictions have fully accepted Marvin, 3 while others
51 La. Ann. 1355, 26 So. 266 (1899); Stringer v. Mathes, 41 La. Ann. 985, 7 So. 229
(1889); Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968); Foshee v. Simkin,
174 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
39. See, e.g., Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
40. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
41. See La. Civ. Code art. 2432.
42. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
43. See the analysis in W. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States
§ 5.27 (Supp. 1983); Note, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 389
(1982); Cases include Estate of Steffes, 95 Wis. 2d 490, 290 N.W.2d 697 (1980) (contract
may be express, implied-in-fact, or implied-in-law); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378,
403 A.2d 902 (1979); Levar v, Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Carlson v. Olson, 256
N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Omer
v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983) (express oral contract enforced in opinion generally favorable to Marvin);
see also Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1981); H. Hahlo, Nullity of Marriage
in Canada, with a Sideways Glance at Concubinage 50 (1979) (Ontario will enforce written
pooling contracts); O'hski, The Legal Recognition of Domestic Contracts: The Experience
in Ontario, in Marriage and Cohabitation, supra note 19, at 226, 228-30.
Wholly rejecting Marvin while adhering to the negative-status approach are Rehak v.
Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d
1204 (1979); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir.1983); but
see Spafford v. Coats, 118 Ill. App. 3d 566, 455 N.E.2d 241 (1983) (CW may invoke implied-
in-law trust doctrine to trace her money contributions to property to which CM has title.).
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allow suit on an express but not an implied-in-law contract.4 4 In some
states the implied-in-law (quantum meruit) contract remedy is recognized 5
while other aspects of Marvin remain undecided.
A. Criticism of the Marvin Approach
1. Express Contracts
Cohabitants of course should be able to contract freely between
themselves concerning property and support rights both during and at the
termination of their relationship. Unfortunately, few cohabiting couples
make such express contracts.4 6 Especially in states which limit the Marvin
remedy to express agreements, this contract-law approach invites outright
perjury concerning an oral understanding, or what might be called quasi-
perjury, by which one of the cohabitants, after the breakup of the couple,
"recalls" a conversation about their agreeing to share their lives together
which he or she after-the-fact contorts (perhaps even in good faith) into
a community-property type pooling contract.
The express contract will usually be oral,4 7 and under Marvin will
almost always present a litigable issue concerning the severance problem.
Indeed, even a carefully drafted written agreement which says nothing
about the sharing of sexual relations as part of the consideration might
raise a severance question under the common-law doctrine that the Parol
Evidence Rule is no barrier to proving the true consideration of a
contract."
44. Compare Merrill v. Davis, 100 N.M. 552, 553, 673 P.2d 1285, 1286 (1983) ("We
do not recognize an implied agreement .. ") with Dominguez v. Curz, 95 N.M. 1, 617
P.2d 1322 (App. 1980) (express agreement enforceable); see Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d
481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980).
45. See Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1975); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d
405 (Utah 1977); Huniston v. Bushnell, 118 N.H. 759, 394 A.2d 844 (1978).
46. Numerous writers have observed that the typical cohabiting couple lacks the
sophistication to enter into an express contract governing the relationship. See, e.g., Clark,
supra note 26, at 451; Bruch, supra note 26, at 102, 135; Note, Property Rights Upon
Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1708, 1718 (1977); Folberg &
Buren, at 465; Casad, supra note 4, at 49.
It has also been observed that often there is no equal bargaining power between the
male and female parties entering into a cohabitation relationship; if a contract is in fact
made, CW may feel compelled to accept the terms dictated by CM. Blumberg, Cohabita-
tion Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1163 (1981).
47. Wand, supra note 19, at 115. The oral agreement seems to be a good candidate
for bringing "fault" analysis back into the process of judicial supervision of the termina-
tion of a marital-type relationship despite the modern no-fault policy of contemporary divorce
law concerning the lawfully married. Example: "I told her we'd share our gains only if
she was faithful to me." Or: "A condition of my agreeing to support her was that there
would be no nagging." See Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 274.
48. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. May, 217 Ark. 215, 229 S.W.2d 238 (1950); Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change-A Proposal for Individual Contracts
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At least in California, the entire contract is invalid even if sexual
sharing is but one of many forms of consideration a live-in lover is to
provide. In a case where one cohabitant had the candor to actually plead
a contract of mixed consideration, the court so held at the demurrer
stage.49 (This contract involved a same-sex couple, a fact that had nothing
to do with the court's handling of the issue of tainted consideration.)
Marvin will thus spawn many cases in which one cohabitant, say CW,
alleges a contract as to which sex played no part of the consideration.
In defense, CM can deny generally the existence of any such agreement
but may ultimately at trial take the position that the couple did have a
pooling agreement, but that each of them understood it was contingent
on their sharing sexual favors. CM would argue that the moment either
cohabitant demanded a "separate bedrooms" policy, the sharing of gains
would end even if the pair, still friends, continued to share the same liv-
ing quarters.
The writer joins commentators"° and courts5' who find it inconceivable
that a jury strictly following the instructions given them under Marvin
concerning tainted consideration could believe CW's version of the alleged
contract. But the jury will have considerable sympathy for CW and may
consider the instruction to embody a foolish notion concerning immorali-
ty. Verdicts for CW will certainly be forthcoming in some cases, but most
such verdicts will be the result of jury nullification. On the other hand,
the jury's verdict in the trial of John Hinckley for attempted assassina-
and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1169, 1274 (1974); 30 Am. Jur. 2d
Evidence § 1056 (1967). The rule is similar under Louisiana's civil law jurisprudence. See
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Consolidated Com-
panies, Inc. v. Angelloz, 170 So. 556 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936); Texas Co. v. Couvillon,
160 So. 839 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935). Only if a third party has relied to his detriment
on the existence of the recited consideration does there arise an estoppel to show the actual
consideration was different (or nonexistent). See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Caneco Con-
struction, Inc., 341 So. 2d 1331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
49. Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 501, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (1981). The
plaintiff alleged a contract under which plaintiff would render his services "as a lover, com-
panion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper, and cook" to his cohabitant. The
court held that this form of agreement made sex a nonseverable component of the con-
sideration. See also Note, supra note 18, at 381 (problem of severing sexual consideration
from balance of contract means express contract remedy is "limited severely").
50. See Simitian, Property Rights and the Unmarried Homemaker: Marvin v. Marvin
and the California Experience, 5 Com. Prop. J. 3, 7 (1978): "It would seem clear that,
typically, the cohabitation of the parties is an essential condition of the relationship .... "
51. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). "[lit would seem
more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of common law marriage than
to continue displaying the naivete we believe involved in the assertion that there are in-
volved in these relationships contracts separate and independent from the sexual activity,
and the assumption that those contracts would have been entered into or would continue
without that activity." Id. at 60, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
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tion of President Reagan signals CM that triers of fact cannot be counted
on to indulge in nullification. This situation-where there is great uncer-
tainty as to what a trier of fact will do despite a general agreement on
the facts-could increase the amount of litigation in this area of law and
decrease settlements. In any event, a doctrine of "freedom of contract"
that generally depends on jury nullification before a contract can exist
seems an intolerable response to the issues of property and support rights
of cohabitants.
One solution to the reliance under Marvin on nullification is to change
the law's handling of the severance issue. The Oregon Supreme Court
did so in the case of an alleged express oral agreement for pooling by
a couple living in a defacto marriage, concluding that it would be "un-
duly harsh" to invalidate the agreement simply because sharing of sex
outside of marriage was implicit in it: "We are not validating an agree-
ment in which the only or primary consideration is sexual intercourse.
The agreement here contemplated all the burdens and amenities of mar-
ried life." 5 2 As will be pointed out below, however, even in Oregon the
express contract remedy may be inadequate for the few cohabitants that
make express contracts because of the inhospitable impact of federal tax,
bankruptcy, and entitlement laws.
2. Implied Contracts
In Marvin jurisdictions recognizing such a remedy, the implied-in-fact
contract remedy is available to a cohabitant who is honest enough to con-
cede the absence of an express oral contract or who alleges the implied
contract as an alternative theory in the event the jury finds no express
contract. Whether to imply a contract form cohabitation probably will
be the chief issue in most cases litigated under Marvin.
The outcome of litigation under the implied contract theory usually
will be impossible to prognosticate. One uncertainty, in California at least,
is whether, if the trier of fact finds there was an implied contract, it will
also find that sexual sharing was not part of the consideration. As
previously indicated, if a jury scrupulously follows instructions based on
Marvin, it ought to find sexual sharing to be part of the consideration,
but jury nullification out of sympathy is quite possible.
The uncertainty on the initial question of implied contract vel non
is based not on possible nullification but rather on what inferences the
trier of fact will or will not draw. It seems, therefore, that in the over-
whelming majority of cases no basis for appeal will exist (if instructions
or findings are not erroneous). Thus in Marvin itself on remand, the trial
court declined to find an implied contract between Lee Marvin and Michele
52. Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 427, 547 P.2d 144, 147 (1976).
1984] 1689
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Triolo.13 Surely, however, it would not have been reversed had it chosen
to imply a pooling agreement from the couple's lifestyle.
Even in the strongest case for an implied pooling contract it seems
that the trier of fact could reject the inferences favoring the existence
of such a contract.5 4 Imagine a case where for ten years CM-cohabiting
with CW in a community property state-deposited his pay-check into
a bank account taken out in the names of both cohabitants. During the
ten years CW sometimes worked for pay and sometimes remained at home
performing domestic services. All of CW's paychecks went into the same
account, except on one occasion when she endorsed her check over to
an antique dealer to buy a Chinese vase for $400, receiving a sales slip
naming CW as purchaser. In litigation arising after the couple split up,
it was learned the vase is actually worth $40,000.
Some triers of fact might infer from the almost uniform practice con-
cerning deposit of paychecks that the couple had a pooling agreement
with terms similar to the state's community property regime. But the in-
ference that the joint account was merely for convenience could be drawn
as well, especially in light of CW's major purchase made in her own name.
The implied contract might be that each cohabitant had the option to
place earnings into a pooled account subject to the sharing agreement
or to withhold the earnings for separate investment.
The writer would find that the vase is co-owned under an implied-in-
fact contract, but, if he were an appellate court judge, could not reverse
a judgment based on a verdict or findings of a trier of fact that declined
to infer such an agreement.
Suppose that while CM was seeking half ownership of the vase under
53. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
54. See generally Note, supra note 46, at 1717. The effect of a system under which
the judge, approaching each cohabitation case on an ad hoc basis with numerous judge-
made doctrines such as implied contract, resulting trust, etc., which the court can adopt
or reject as it wishes, is described in Finaly, The Informal Marriage in Anglo-Australian
Law, in The Informal Marriage in Anglo-Australian Law 156 (M. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds.
1980):
The problem with judicial lawmaking [of this type] . . . is uncertainty. If the
availability of the remedy is to depend simply on the idiosyncracy of the judge
acting in accordance with his or her perception of a need to ameliorate a situa-
tion involving an injustice, and who does so without the certainty of enacted
prescription, then unless judges come to act in such a way as a matter of predic-
table habit and thereby charting new law, the injustice cannot be said to have
been removed.
See also J. O'Donnell & D. Jones, The Law of Marriage and Marital Alternatives 190 (1982)
(written agreement needed because courts are fickle); Casad, supra note 4, at 49 (implied
agreement "unreliable" theory); Deech, supra note 19, at 309 (results under implied con-
tract theory will be "arbitrary"); Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 273 (uncertainty of legal




implied contract law, CW responded that if there were such a contract,
it should be viewed as a contract by each cohabitant to undertake to the
extend possible under the law all of the support and property obligations
attaching to a lawful marriage, and that she was thus entitled to an
alimony-type award of periodic payments because of CM's contractual
obligation to support her for life.
Even though the writer accepted the inference CM urged considering
the sharing of all paychecks received during the cohabitation, he would
not infer from the living and banking arrangements a promise by CM
to support CW. That the couple chose not to marry is inconsistent with
a life-long undertaking of support. Thus the writer would infer only a
contract terminable at the will of either party," with each party entitled
at termination to an accounting based on implied promises to share net
gains on hand plus those already earned by labor but not yet received
(such as a contingent fee in lawyer CM's lawsuit which he won and is
defending on appeal).
On the other hand, another trier of fact might infer from the ten-
year cohabitation, during which CW worked only sporadically and hence
effectively scuttled career opportunities, that CM may have acted in a
manner that led CW reasonably to believe she would be entitled to such
support, a fairly strong basis for implying the contract she urged in seek-
ing an alimony-type award. As an appellate court judge, the writer could
not reverse a judgment rendered after the trier of fact drew such an
inference.
In sum, a huge cloud of uncertainty looms over the implied contract
remedy. In contrast, a status approach to the above hypothetical would,
if the facts were agreed on, result in a directed verdict. Under the old
negative-status approach, CW's title to the vase is conclusive and she is
not entitled to support. Under the positive-status approach proposed below
in this article, CM and CW would clearly be lawful cohabitants, giving
CM a half interest in the vase and CW support rights for a short period
of time only.
3. Quantum Meruit
Although a quantum meruit recovery theoretically is one under
implied-in-law rather than implied-in-fact contract, the remedy should not
be available if the trier of fact concludes that the parties had an express
contract for pooling of gains (or, more unlikely, for payment for services
rendered without regard to overall gain). Likewise, quantum meruit should
not be available if the trier of fact finds an implied contract. The express
or implied-in-fact contractual remedy should be held to be exclusive, just
55. Accord Simitian, supra note 50, at 5 (proposing that any contract must be a "hir-
ing at will").
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as the status law (or alternatively created contract-based) remedies are ex-
clusive at termination of a lawful marriage, barring a lawful wife from
claiming the value of her services under quantum meruit.
The quantum meruit claim is likely to be asserted at termination of
the relationship by a cohabitant-usually CW, especially if she was a stay-
at-home cohabitant not working for pay-not only when it is believed
that the trier of fact would find no express or implied agreement, but
also when such a pooling agreement could be found but there are no
or little net gains to divide.
The quantum meruit claim is as uncertain as the implied contract.
First, Marvin declares that the quantum meruit recovery can be given only
if the trier of fact finds that the services were rendered not gratuitously
but with expectation of payment. 6 A trier of fact is probably free in
almost all cohabitation cases to draw the inference either way.
In most situations where CW relies on quantum meruit, there will
be little net gain during cohabitation to divide under pooling contract
theories, but CM will have other wealth (e.g., a house he owned before
CW moved in) that could be seized if not exempt to pay damages awarded
under CW's quantum meruit theory. Thus CM may make the perhaps
surprising defense to the quantum meruit claim that in fact the agreed-on
compensation for services was the pooling of gains earned by labor dur-
ing the cohabitation.
CM also has the defense, likely to be meritorious in most cases where
quantum meruit could be asserted, that the benefits such as housing, food,
and recreation, which he provided CW during their cohabitation are of
greater value than the services she provided. 7 (This defense would very
likely be valid if one concluded that CW could recover not for one hun-
dred percent of domestic services but only for the excess domestic work
she had to do because two persons rather than one lived in the shared
abode.) Indeed, as one commentator has noted, " since CW is treating
the arrangement with CM as commercial by suing for the value of ser-
vices rendered, he may have a tenable claim for restitution based on the
theory that benefits he provided overpaid CW.
56. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. See also Slocum
v. Hammond, 10 Fam. L. Rptr. 1323 (Iowa S. Ct. March 14, 1984) (no recovery because
CW held to have gratuitously rendered services to CM).
Simitian, supra note 50, suggests that such services are probably not rendered gratuitously
but rather are rendered with the expectation by W that CM will provide the very food,
housing, etc. that he did in fact provide, but without any additional monetary payment.
Id. at 5.
57. See Simitian, supra note 50, at 5-6. See also Deech, supra note 19, at 304; Note,
supra note 46, at 1717 (court must value quality of food, housing, etc. provided to reduce
or offset quantum meruit recovery). Casad, supra note 4, at 53, 55.
58. Simitian, supra note 50, at 5-6.
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Thus a claim by CW in quantum meruit not only is fraught with
the possibilities of being defeated or reduced to a pittance, but also
characterizing the arrangement with CM as commercial risks adverse con-
sequences to CW.
4. Implied-in-Law Trust
A smattering of cases employ implied-in-law trust remedies to sort
out the property claims of cohabitants upon termination of their relation-
ship. These cases use the trust device as a remedy to carry out the inten-
tion of the cohabitants, and hence are properly viewed as types of cases
using the Marvin contract rationale. For example, in a Washington
decision59 the appellate court found an implied pooling contract between
CM and CW, who both worked at a successful business. Title to various
gains had been placed in CM's name. To avoid inequity to CW, the court
held the constructive trust remedy was available. This remedy would place
CW in a better position with respect to those assets than creditors of
CM who had not taken a security interest.
When one cohabitant, say, CW, has contributed her funds towards
acquisition of property with title taken in CM's name, the purchase money
resulting trust remedy may be available. Treating CM and CW as strangers
to each other, there would not be a presumption that the contribution
was a gift by CW to CM;6 ° instead, a purchase money resulting trust
would be presumed. However, since the pair have somewhat the same
intimate relationship as a lawfully married couple, courts of equity could
reasonably apply to cohabitants the presumption of gift that arises when
a lawful spouse makes such a contribution. 6 Either way, whether or not
the resulting trust will be imposed depends on the intent of the party
contributing the money to make a gift or buy a share of ownership.
One problem facing a cohabitant seeking an implied-in-trust remedy
is the unclean hands defense in equity. Presumably, the mere fact of
cohabitation will not bar equitable relief, since a predicate of availability
of the remedy at all is rejection of the negative-status approach to hand-
ling cohabitants' property rights, indicating that the presence of "immoral"
conduct will not stay the hand of the court. However, "fault" conduct
by the cohabitant seeking relief-such as a secret affair which caused the
breakup of the relationship with the other cohabitant-might constitute
unclean hands, barring relief by way of implied-in-law trust.6"
59. Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
60. See Restatement (Second) Trusts § 440 (1957).
61. See Restatement (Second) Trusts § 442 (1957).
62. See Deech, supra note 19 at 304; Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 271. But see Otner,
II Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974), where the cohabitants set up their relationship
as part of an immigration fraud on the federal government and the appellate court had
no hesitation in finding the constructive trust remedy available for CW.
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B. Interaction With Federal Law
1. Federal Taxation
A property-rights contract between cohabitants having no status rela-
tionship will not achieve the income tax, gift tax, or estate tax benefits
accorded by federal law to the married. Instead, there may be very
detrimental income or gift tax consequences. In many instances, the treat-
ment accorded the cohabitants by federal law would extend to any state
taxes similar in nature.
Even though the cohabitants may reside in a community property state
and contract for a sharing of gains under provisions identical to the local
community property law, splitting of income on tax returns will not be
allowed.63 For this purpose, it is irrelevant whether the contract is self-
executing so that CW is the immediate owner of half of CM's earnings
without his having to do anything by way of assignment, delivery, or
transfer of title, in order to implement the pooling contract. In Commis-
sioner v. Harmon," in which an Oklahoma couple had opted by agree-
ment to come under a legal community regime that was an alternative
to the automatic separation of property regime, the United States Supreme
Court found that the husband had assigned half his income to the wife.
Under the principles of Lucas v. Earl,65 he was taxable on all of the in-
63. See Blumberg, supra note 46, at 1157-59.
64. 323 U.S. 44 (1944). See L. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract?
1138-41, 1183 (1979).
Although it is clear that cohabitants are not lawfully entitled to income splitting, many
of them in fact file joint returns, representing to the Internal Revenue Service that they
are married. This fact-filing of joint returns as married persons-is often listed among
the items of evidence showing that the pair had a Marvin-type contractual arrangement,
see, e.g., Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983), or
such a stable relationship that rules of law for dividing property at divorce among the lawfully
married should be applied to the cohabitants, see Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345,
109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
Some of the staunchest supporters of the contract model of sharing of gains for cohabitants
simply ignore the tax (as well as bankruptcy) problems this approach creates and have pro-
posed contract forms that almost seem to invite tax fraud. See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note
48, at 1286 (providing a form contract for homosexual couples that provides that after
its execution the earnings of each "will become community property"); L. Weitzman, supra
note 19, at 326-27. This intended result is impossible'not only from a taxation standpoint,
but also under state marital property law. At most a form of tenancy in common can result,
and unless greater care is taken to spell out the consideration for tax purposes, there is
almost certain to be a finding of assignment of income.
65. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in Unmarried Couples
and the Law 189, 247-48 (G. Douthwaite ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Unmarried Couples].
Incoming splitting is available if the cohabitants establish a bona fide business partner-
ship. Both must either actually labor at the business or make capital contributions; the
mere agreement to share income is insufficient. See Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S. 553 (1924);
Payton v. United States, 425 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Ramas,
393 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970) (Alleged family partnership
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come. The case of a conventional regime of sharing of gains between
unmarried persons is obviously a much weaker case for income splitting
than was Harmon.
Since sharing of gains by contract, unlike a rule of status automatically
attaching without affirmative action by the parties, does not create a com-
munity property for income taxation of salary, the same should be true
with respect to taxation of capital gains. Thus, even if the cohabitants
have the type of contract that attempts to follow as closely as possible
community property law, on the death of one the survivor will not get
a stepped-up basis under section 1041(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code
as he would if the co-owned property were actually community."
If the cohabitants' agreement provides for a support obligation so
that, for example, CW can obtain an award of periodic payments,
set up in an attempt to spread income found to be a sham because contributions were
not needed or used.); Pogetto v. United States, 306 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1962).
Apparently the only reported case where cohabitants have succeeded in splitting income
on a business partnership theory is Ryza v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 269 (1977).
Among other projects, CM worked as an illegal abortionist, and the Tax Court observed
that CW "worked with him, dividing the labors and sharing the profits." Id. at 271. See
also Nichols v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1322 (1959) (Married couple established a business
partnership enabling them to use partnership fiscal year for income.). Cf. Teitelbaum v.
Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1965) (insufficient evidence of labor contributed to
alleged partnership by ex-wife of taxpayer).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 1014(b)(6) (1983). Many other provisions of the federal income tax
law provide special benefits to couples living under a legal regime of community property
which will undoubtedly be unavailable to unmarried cohabitants who simply contract for
a community. See, e.g., Berry & Craige, Estate Planning for Qualified Retirement Plan
and IRA Distributions-Community Property Considerations, 5 C.E.B. Estate Planning and
California Probate Reporter 85 (Feb. 1984).
Many other tax benefits of marriage apply in common-law as well as community-prop-
erty states. Thus, if a couple coowns property in any form and one of them is over age
55, upon sale $100,000 worth of gain can be deferred under § 121 of the Internal Revenue
Code even if half of it results from sale of the interest of the party under age 55, provided
they are married. If the pair were cohabitants the seller aged 55 could defer only gain at-
tributable to his interest. See Wenig, supra note 65, at 207-08.
If the couple is married, one can deduct from his income medical expenses paid for
the other, but often this deduction cannot be taken if the pair are simply cohabitants. See
Cox v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. 1435 (1977); Stark v. United States, 351 F.2d 160 (6th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966).
It is difficult for one cohabitant to claim the other as his dependent for income tax
purposes. If the relationship involves sexual activity illegal under local law, he may not
do so. 26 U.S.C. § 152(b)(5) (1983); Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758 (1957)
(cohabitation involved "illicit intimacy"). Some cases have misapplied § 152(b)(5) to disallow
the dependency claim simply because the union is considered immoral even when it is not
in violation of criminal laws concerning sexual conduct. Wenig, supra note 65, at 238.
If the cohabitants have a Marvin-type pooling contract, express or implied, the I.R.S.
takes the position that stay-at-home CW who performs domestic services is not in fact depen-
dent but is one earning her own support by performing services. Wenig, supra note 65,
at 238, 253.
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cohabitants in common-law as well as in community property states will
suffer the absence of tax benefits accorded persons lawfully married. Since
a needy CW will surely be in a lower tax bracket than the CM ordered-
after their falling apart-to pay support under their cohabitation agree-
ment, there is a net tax benefit if CM can deduct his payments as alimony"7
and the recipient reports them as income to her. The net savings due to
the alimony deduction and the lower tax rate for the ex-CW could be
a basis for larger payments. However, it seems clear that because the
couple were not lawfully married, an alimony deduction is not available."8
It is probable, however, that the support payments the ex-CW receives
can be characterized by the Internal Revenue Service as a return for ser-
vices previously rendered so that the payments are still taxable to her. 9
The above are examples of special benefits for lawful spouses that
are not available to cohabitants. The detriments of a fifty-fifty pooling
contract between cohabitants have been ably canvassed by Professor Mary
M. Wenig.7 ° In the situation of a stay-at-home CW, at least part of the
consideration for the sharing of CM's gains will often be CW's rendition
of services of a type for which remuneration is paid. Examples are cook-
ing, house-cleaning, and caring for CM during illness. The portion of
benefits accruing to CW under the contract for these services rendered
usually will not be apportionable from consideration she gives of the type
that is not likely to be viewed as earning remuneration for services rendered
(e.g., giving love and moral support to CM). Accordingly the Internal
Revenue Service can fairly assert that CM is taxable on one hundred per-
cent of his gain and CW is taxable on fifty percent of it, which passes
to her by assignment because she earned it by performing services.7' Seldom
67. 16 U.S.C. § 2503 (1983).
68. See M. Wenig, supra note 65, at 201.
69. Wenig, supra note 54, at 198.
If the periodic payments or even a lump sum is awarded to CW at the breakup of
the relationship as a means of "doing equity," see Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386,
523 P.2d 957 (1974), as, for example, recompense to her for sacrificing a career to act
as a spouse-substitute, see Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555
(1981) (reversing such an award for lack of proof of contractual relationship as a founda-
tion for it), then the Internal Revenue Service could claim CW is receiving ordinary income
as forbearance from employment. Wenig, supra note 65, at 201. Note that on just about
any theory that makes the payment to CW ordinary income to her, she will owe not just
income taxes but either self-employment taxes as well or an employee's share of FICA taxes.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1503-1509 (1983).
70. See Wenig, supra note 65.
71. Wenig, supra note 65, at 195-96. See also Jones v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
1323 (1977), where the IRS successfully contended that money a lover gave his mistress
was income for providing sexual services. Wenig, supra note 65, notes that if CW is taxable
on what she obtains under the pooling contract with CM on the theory that she has earned
it by providing domestic household services, CW should be able to exclude the value of
food and lodging provided by CM on the ground that she had to be on the premises at
all hours for her "employer's" convenience.
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will CM be able to take any deduction, although he could in part if CW
were performing business-related services such as doing the account books
for CM's retail shop. 71 If CM had children, possibly a child-care credit
could be squeezed out of part of what the law views as CM's assignment
over to CW for services.
To the extent that the Internal Revenue Service should view the benefit
coming to CW from CM as being paid in consideration for her love and
moral support or other services incapable of monetary value, the transfer
is a taxable gift. 73 Since the couple is not married, the unlimited marital
deduction7" is not available. Tax liability can be avoided to a considerable
degree by applying the $10,000 annual exclusion, 75 but for cases where
CM has a large income, avoidance of payment of a gift tax will require
CM's using up the unified credit applicable to both federal gift and federal
estate tax.76 When the unified credit is gone, gift taxes will have to be
paid; even if the credit is not used up during the relationship, the loss
of part of the credit will likely have adverse inheritance-tax consequences
at CM's death.
If both CW and CM have income-producing jobs or investments, the
pooling agreement will have less disastrous results. With respect to earned
income, no contract between the cohabitants can create a marital status;
thus they are not in danger of incurring the marriage penalty 77 of federal
income tax law which, despite some recent relief by way of credits, 78 still
burdens the lawfully married when both have substantial incomes from,
labor. 79 Additionally, it seems that whether or not the sharing is viewed
as based on an exchange of services or on reciprocal gifts, an offset is
available so that the income or gift tax falls only on the net gain. Thus,
if CW earns a net $50,000 per year and CM a net $30,000, the agreement
in effect operates only on the excess $20,000 income made by CW. CM
72. See Note, 6 Calif. Fam. L. Rptr. 2310 (1983) (IRS accepted allocation of portion
of funds passing from CM to CW as payment for business services but major portion was
treated as coming to her under a Marvin-type arrangement and was thus not deductible
by CM).
73. Wenig, supra note 65, at 197, 201. The theory is that CW's vague undertaking
to act as a quasi-wife is not an obligation that can be valued in "money's worth." 26
U.S.C. § 2514 (1983).
74. 26 U.S.C. § 2516 (1983).
75. 26 U.S.C. § 2512 (1983).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 2514 (1983).
77. See Wenig, supra note 65, at 203. Another tax-law benefit of cohabiting rather
than marrying is that an unmarried person with dependent children can claim head-of-
household status and consequently lower federal income tax rates; that status is lost if the
person marries someone with equivalent income. Wenig, supra note 65, at 209. Benefits
under § 151(e) of the Code accorded to a widow or widower with children during the first
two years of such status will be lost upon marriage but not upon nonmarital cohabitation.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 2315 (1983).
79. See Lathrope, supra note 19, at 271; Note, supra note I, at 384-85 n.18.
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receives either a $10,000 gift which can be shielded by the annual exclu-
sion or $10,000 in income for services rendered. Obviously, the couple
should attempt to structure the agreement so that what CM obtains is
in consideration of love and affection and not services rendered. The
benefit to CM would be more clearly a gift if the contract provided for
a sharing of gains to the extent of the income of the cohabitant earning
the lesser amount, which would be invested to the extent possible in co-
owned real estate, securities, etc. This would mean, in the hypothetical
case above, that CW would separately own the additional $20,000 of her
net income; she would spend it on upkeep of the couple's household,
but not under compulsion of the contract. Since CW would incur many
household expenditures if living alone, the amount of her gift to CM by
providing basic maintenance should be much less than $10,000. Thus the
suggested semi-sharing contract will be especially useful when one cohabi-
tant's earnings are more than $20,000 above the other cohabitant's earings.
A few cohabitants may desire a pooling-of-gains contract with an ar-
rangement whereby one of them works for a year while the other takes
care of the home and then they switch roles for the next year. To avoid
possible unfortunate tax consequences, the cohabitants should make very
sure that their tax year is not the same as their "work year." For exam-
ple, if they pay federal income taxes on a calendar year basis, the work
year should begin July 1. This choice would allow an offset of the earn-
ings by one, say CW, from January to June, against the earnings of CM
from July through December. Such an offset would not be allowed if
CW worked the entire calendar year of 1985 and attempted to reduce
gift tax liability by treating as consideration half of CM's 1984 earnings
(during which year CW was the stay-at-home cohabitant)." The problem
could be avoided if the agreement provided that no interest of CW in
CM's 1984 earnings would vest in her until January 1, 1985, but this
non-self-executing feature of the sharing arrangement raises other prob-
lems to be discussed below.
Viewing the pooling agreement as exchanges based on services rendered
rather than as gifts raises the slight chance of an offset, even though the
calendar year and the work year are the same and the agreement is self
executing, so that in year 1984 when CM works, CW automatically
80. See Wenig, supra note 65, at 151. Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-2 C.B. 24. These law-
fully married spouses contracted to live in universal community (which meant, of course,
that as each acquired separate property (e.g., an inheritance) it would automatically be
transmuted into community property). The ruling declaring a gift tax to be owing indicates
that if Husband inherited a $200,000 ranch in one year and the next year Wife inherited
$200,000 in stocks, neither could avoid gift tax liability by claiming an offset. The ruling
was rendered before Congress enacted the unlimited marital deduction in 1981. The no-
offset theory applied there in a gift tax context could be applicable if the IRS asserted
that transfers between cohabitants were not gifts but payments for service.
1698 [Vol. 44
FAMILY LA W
becomes owner of half of his earnings. CM, of course, must pay tax on
one hundred percent of his gain. It is CW who argues that she has no
gain in 1984 because as a share of CM's income vested in her it was
offset by her obligation to him to be fulfilled in 1985. CW's argument
probably could prevail only if her 1985 obligation to CM was of a fixed
amount (e.g., they are both lawyers at a firm where they fill a single
associate's slot at known annual pay) and was binding on her or her estate
if for some reason she was unable to work in 1985.
2. Bankruptcy law
Support rights 'of a divorced person formerly lawfully married are
not discharged by the obligor's bankruptcy." Property rights-including
obligations under a property settlement agreement at divorce to pay sums
of money as part of an equitable or equal distribution-can be8 and have
been discharged. 3 If a cohabitant, through express or implied contract,
becomes liable to pay periodic payments for the purposes of support of
the other cohabitant after their falling apart, the writer predicts that the
contract basis of the obligation will be controlling in bankruptcy. The
obligation thus can be discharged.
What of the effect of bankruptcy of a cohabitant, say CM, on claims
under a pooling-of-gains agreement by CW? Is she just a general creditor?8"
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1983) (barring discharge of a debt "to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse
or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
.... "). The statute also expressly states that the mere label "alimony" or "child support"
attached by a state judge to an order is not conclusive, but that the debt is nevertheless
dischargeable "unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support." I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1983). Unless otherwise noted, all references to sections
of the bankruptcy act are to the "new" act of 1978. See generally Note, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: Dischargeability of Obligations Incurred Under Property Settlements,
Separation Agreements, and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. Bait. L. Rev. 520 (1983).
82. Ultimately, the bankruptcy courts employ a federal standard to distinguish prop-
erty from support awards. See In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Ren-
zulli, 28 B.R. 41 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1982); Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1975)
(characterizing attorney's fee award as nondischargeable alimony). However, in applying
the standard, the courts are strongly guided by state law. Whether a state court judge in-
tended an award to serve a support function because of need or to serve as remuneration
for contributions to the marriage that helped make it possible for the other spouse to ac-
quire property is often controlling. E.g., In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
The reference to state law seems similar to that made in the income tax context to deter-
mine whether a periodic payment labeled alimony actually is alimony so that it may be
deductible by the payor. See Boucher v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Ramsey, 612 F.2d, 1220
(9th Cir. 1980) (part of community property division. resulting in unequal division contrary
to state court's intention). See also In re Tilmon, 9 B.R. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (would
have discharged a divorce court award remunerating wife for services rendered, but found
to be in the nature of alimony).
84. If the Marvin agreement is not self-executing, CW's position as a judgment creditor
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Consider the case where CM is deeply in debt and has purchased nonex-
empt items (e.g., a yacht) from his earnings during the cohabitation, hav-
ing taken title in his own name. If the couple lived in a community prop-
erty state and their agreement was to adopt as much of the community
property law as they could, it is possible that CW has a half interest in
the asset that creditors cannot reach. In a community property state, title
(here in CM's name alone) is not conclusive of ownership,8" and in some
community property states a wife's half interest is not liable for the hus-
band's "separate debts." 6 (Under state law his half interest also is not
liable but Congress can if it wishes pre-empt this form of exemption under
its power to enact bankruptcy laws. 87)
Under a community property regime, however, the lawful wife
automatically becomes half owner of the husband's onerous acquisitions
during marriage because of her status." The cohabiting CW is in a similar
posture only if her pooling agreement is intended to be and can be self-
executing-i.e., no act of CM, such as writing out an assignment, deliver-
ing an asset to CW, or taking title in the pair's joint names-is necessary
to carry out the promise he has made to share ownership of gains.
Even if they have made an express contract, the parties probably have
not thought about whether the provision to share gains is self executing;
the law will have to "fill in the blank," as it obviously must if the pool-
ing agreement is implied in fact. If, however, the express agreement was
to incorporate as much of community property law as legally possible,
the intention is that the agreement be self-executing, and the issue becomes
whether it lawfully can be.
against CM to recover the value of half his earnings during their union may be, wholly
apart from bankruptcy law, of little value because CM can shield his property through
laws providing exemptions for judgment debtors. In California, for example, the generous
exemption statues protect $30,000 of equity in a home, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 704.730(a)
(West Supp. 1984), $1200 equity in an automobile, $2500 in tools of trade, all ordinarily-
used household furnishings, unlimited amounts of most kinds of tort recoveries, etc. Id.
§§ 704.010-704.200.
85. See, e.g., W. de Funiak & M. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property § 60,
at 119 (2d ed. 1971).
86. See, e.g., McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949); deElche v. Jacobsen,
95 Wash. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-10 (1983).
87. See, e.g., In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Over-
man, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Babb v. Schmidt, 456 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Cal. Civ. Code § 5105 (West 1983);
La. Civ. Code art. 2336.
89. Estate of Fincher, 119 Cal. App. 3d 343, 174 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1981). The terms
of a written or oral agreement may or may not reveal that the parties considered the matter
of how a stay-at-home cohabitant would become co-owner of the other's acquisitions. Com-
pare Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d 651, 655, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54, 56 (1983) ("Buster
assured Judy that she would be financially compensated .... "-surely ambiguous) with
Hierholzer v. Sardy, 128 Mich. App. 259, 340 N.W. 2d 91 (1983) (CW pleads promise
of CM as to make future conveyance).
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It is unclear what the law will presume concerning self-execution of
CW's property rights under a pooling agreement which is silent on the
matter. One California case"9 indicates the court assumed that such an
agreement was not self executing, although the briefs9" and court opinion
show that neither counsel nor the court actually addressed the issue in
such terms. The ex-CW asserted Marvin-based claims against the estate
of her former CM, who raised a statute of limitations defense. The court
held the applicable statute was that concerning breach of an oral agree-
ment, and that the two years began to run when the couple split up.9
This conclusion assumed the Marvin agreement was not self-executing.
If it had been, CM would not have breached the contract since the law
would have automatically made CW half owner of his acquisitions dur-
ing the cohabitation. Co-ownership, probably in tenancy in common,
would, after their splitting up, have remained even though CM kept posses-
sion of assets traceable to his earnings. The applicable statute of limita-
tion would have been that governing suits to recover possession of per-
sonal and/or real property (whatever the ex-CW could trace to). The
perscriptive period would not have begun to run until the former CM
had repudiated any interest in his ex-CW cotenant.92
On the other hand, another California decision 93-once again in which
90. CW's brief was vague and inconsistent. She had alleged and the jury found via
a special verdict that "any asset or liability thereafter acquired or incurred by either party
would be equally owned by the two of them." Estate of Fincher, Calif. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Civ. No. 57194, at 4. That finding is consistent with the agreement's being self-executing.
But the brief also says that "the deceased (CM) held Appellant's interest there in trust,"
id. at 19, and that "the implied agreement ... created a debt and a duty on the deceased
to account for partnership assets. A partner who receives and keeps the proceeds from a
partnership business is indebted to the partnership for the amount so retained by him."
Id. at 19. CW's brief also said the issue on appeal was whether she had "waived her rights
to enforce the implied agreement . . .", also inconsistent with its being self-executing. In
her petition for hearing in the Supreme Court, CW said, "Based on their mutual promises
and assurances, Appellant had the reasonable expectation that there would be an equal divi-
sion of the Marvin assets ... at the time of [CM's] death." Petition for Hearing in California
Supreme Court 5.
91. See also Nelson v. Nevel, 201 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984). CW sought relief under an
implied sharing contract under Marvin, urging she should be awarded a half interest in
property to which CM had taken title. Assuming CW sought to enforce an oral agreement,
the court found her suit barred by the two-year California statute of limitations applicable
to actions to enforce oral agreements. The appellate court reversed on the theory that CW's
cause of action could be viewed as one in equity seeking to impose a constructive trust
and thus subject to a four-year limitations period. No one suggested that CW was actually
an owner of a half interest who could bring an action to partition unless she had lost her
ownership due to adverse possession by her cotenant.
92. See, e.g., C. Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 305 (2d ed. 1975) (realty);
4 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 1185 (3d ed. 1939) (real property); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy
and Joint Ownership § 106 (1965).
93. Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1979).
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the briefs9" and court opinion disclose no discussion of the issue of self-
execution of the pooling contract-is at least consistent with a theory that
the contract is, indeed, self executing. CM's tort victim sued both the
cohabitants, although CM alone was negligent. The claim against CW
was based on the allegation that the pair had a Marvin-type agreement.
Suit against CW was dismissed on the ground that "Marvin dealt only
with the determination of rights inter se between the parties .... "'
This statement seems to assume that the agreement is self-executing, so
that plaintiff can levy on a half interest in CW's earnings during the
cohabitation on a judgment running solely against CM, without making
CW a party. However, another explanation could be that the agreement
was not self executing, but the proper procedure for the tort victim was,
after obtaining judgment against CM, to garnish his cause of action against
CW to assign over to him his right to half her earnings.
Only one case clearly treats a Marvin-type pooling agreement as
self-executing. 6 During the pair's union as cohabitants, title to unimproved
land was acquired in CW's name. On the security of the property she
then borrowed funds for construction of a house on the lot. The court
said the nature of the express, oral Marvin agreement was that the pair
would "pool and share their resources and be equal owners of property
acquired" and also found that the lot was purchased "with the under-
standing that they both owned it . . . . -.' The California court went
on to say, the unimproved property was "community" in the sense that
the parties owned it equally. The court then proceeded to apply the law
of community property applicable to married couples to the proceeds of
CW's loan proceeds. They, too, were coowned under the California rule
tracing such proceeds to the security relied on by the lender.9"
An express self-execution clause in the cohabitors' pooling contract
should not be enforceable against third parties who are unaware of the
agreement and who rely to their detriment on the fact that the unmarried
person with whom they deal, say CM, either has title to an asset or was
the party earning it. This protection should extend not only to purchasers
94. The plaintiff argued that persons who are cohabiting under a pooling agreement
"must accept the consequences of such a venture along with its benefits." Planck v. Har-
tung, Appellant's Opening Brief 9, Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Civ., No. 18154. From that
point the brief proceeds to ask for greater liability of CW than would be imposed on a
lawful wife. The latter's separate property would not be liable for her spouse's tort; only
her share in the community would be. Cal. Civ. Code § 5122, But the plaintiff in Planck
tried to impute CM's negligence to CW to make all her property liable. Appellant's Open-
ing Brief at 12.
95. 98 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
96. In re Marriage of Stitt, 147 Cal. App. 3d 579, 195 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1983).
97. Id. at 184-85, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
98. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 185, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 175. See also W. Reppy, Community
Property in California 97-101 (1980).
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for value and persons acquiring a security interest for value, but also to
CM's unsecured creditors who can convince a court that they actually
relied on his being the apparent sole owner of an asset or assets.99
With respect to other third parties, the writer sees no reason why
a self-execution clause in a cohabitant's pooling agreement should not
be effective in community property states. That is, such a contract should
operate in this regard like a business partnership agreement. For exam-
ple, if CW and CM set up a law partnership and CM's client pays him
a fee, no assignment by CM to CW is necessary to vest in her a pro-
prietary interest. ' Nevertheless, since the cohabitants' pooling agreement
is quite different from a commercial partnership, one cannot be confi-
dent that a self-execution clause will be enforceable. Even less clear is
whether such a provision will be implied into a pooling agreement in which,
of course, the cohabitants did not think about the matter. As to implied
contracts, the writer has suggested above that the law should only infer
a contract having terms corresponding to the reasonable expectations of
the cohabitants. It is likely that many, perhaps a majority, of stay-at-
home CWs who do have expectations about how the law responds to their
relationship with a CM think only about their needs at the termination
of the cohabitation by CM's death or the pair's separation; they do not
have notions about presently owning any portion of CM's earnings. Cer-
tainly a CW would not be likely to have such expectations in a common-
law state where even the lawfully married do not automatically become
equal owners of the acquisitions of each by labor during the union.
Additionally, in common-law states where legal coownership is sup-
posed to appear in the title, courts would be more likely to hold invalid
an attempt to create through a self-execution clause in a pooling agree-
ment automatic legal ownership of CW in CM's earnings. It seems highly
unlikely that such a provision, even if valid, would ever be presumed or
99. See, e.g., In re Perry's Estate, 121 Mont. 280, 192 P.2d 532, 536 (1948) (creditor
can rely on record title to land which is inconsistent with actual partnership ownership);
Jeffers v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 508, 601 P.2d 1204 (App. 1979) (Buyer under executory con-
tract who relied on title of seller in making contract can enforce it despite interest of non-
joining husband even though buyer had not parted with any funds.) However, where the
third party does not rely on title when he becomes a creditor, holders of unrecorded equities
inconsistent with the title of the debtor can successfully resist a levy of execution on a
judgment obtained by the creditor. See Breeze v. Brooks, 97 Cal. 72, 31 P. 742 (1892)
(Debtor's brother defeated levying creditor by asserting purchase-money resulting trust.);
5 A. Scott, Trusts § 462.5 (3d ed. 1967). There is a split of authority as to whether, in
this situation, the equity inconsistent with title is lost if not asserted before the judgment
creditor acquires title to the debtor's property by foreclosing on a judgment lien. See, e.g.,
Rexburg Lumber Co. v. Purrington, 62 Idaho 461, 113 P.2d 511 (1941).
100. See Unif. Partnership Act § 8, 6 U.L.A. 115 (1969). Some cases hold that the
proprietary interest of a partner is equitable rather than legal when the acquiring partner
has title placed in his name. See Cyrus v. Cyrus, 242 Minn. 180, 64 N.W.2d 538 (1954);
Killebrew v. Ray, 181 S.W.2d 334 (1944).
19841 1703
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
inferred to be part of such an agreement when the spouses neglected to
deal with the matter or when the agreement as a whole is implied in fact.
If CM's obligation under a Marvin agreement to share ownership of
gains is wholly executory, it can unquestionably be discharged in bank-
ruptcy. On the other hand, it is possible that state law, while not
automatically vesting legal title in CW as to a half interest, gives her some
equitable interest as cestui of an implied in law trust or as holder of an
equitable lien to secure performance of CM's obligation. These kinds of
latent equities generally yield as a matter of state law to the rights of
bona fide purchasers for value and persons obtaining for value a security
interest in the asset,"' although not to unsecured creditors, even those
holding unforeclosed judgment liens.' 2
The Bankruptcy Act, however, declares that a trustee obtains the rights
of a bona fide purchaser;' 3 this provision could mean"' that even equitable
interests automatically created by law under a pooling agreement may be
defeated, converting the claimant cohabitant into a general, unsecured
creditor. Thus, there is a risk that an equitable interest created automatic-
ally by law in favor of one cohabitant at the time the other cohabitant
under a pooling agreement acquires an asset will not be recognized in
bankruptcy as a claim superior to those of general creditors.
101. See supra note 77. Note that if one cohabitant, say CM, places title in CW's name
to assets purchased with his earnings, he is in a position to invoke this doctrine against
her creditors if it is found that CW had no contractual right to any share of the property.
In such a case the legal issue becomes whether CM made a gift to CW of the property
or whether he is the cestui of a purchase-money resulting trust. Bogert says the majority
of cases presume the resulting trust rather than gift when the parties are cohabitants. G.
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 454, 459 (1977). See Bohaker v. Koudelka, 333 Mass. 139,
128 N.E.2d 769 (1955); Wosche v. Kraning, 353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220 (1946).
102. See supra note 99.
103. II U.S.C. § 544(a) (1983).
104. Whether the higher federal courts will construe § 544(a)(3)'s treatment of the
bankruptcy trustee as a purchaser for value remains to be seen. Under the old bankruptcy
act, there was no such provision and the courts applied state law of creditors' rights under
which the beneficiary of resulting or constructive trust in property to which the debtor had
title would prevail over general creditors. E.g., In re Smith, 348 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Va.
1972). Two decisions under the new act have held that reference to the trustee as having
rights of a purchaser for value does not mean he can prevail on behalf of creditors over
the beneficiaries of constructive and resulting trusts. In re Fieldcrest Homes, Inc., 18 B.R.
678 (Bkrtcy. Ct. N.D. Ill. 1982) (relying on a passage in Collier not addressing the problem
of what "purchaser" in section 544(a) means); Lancaster v. Key, 24 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (relying on Smith, 348 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Va. 1972), decided under the old
bankruptcy act). Little faith can be placed in these two holdings from the lowest level of
courts that will be construing section 544(a).
Note that if state law says CW has an equitable interest in CM's acquisitions as a result
of their pooling contract and secures it by a lien on the property, this would seem not
to be the purely judicial kind of lien that creditors can avoid in some circumstances under
the new Act. See In re Thomas, 32 B.R. II (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
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C. Federal Entitlement Programs
A contract between cohabitants to have the same property and sup-
port rights and obligations of persons lawfully married would not entitle
either party to benefits accorded to spouses under major federal entitle-
ment programs. ' Under the Social Security Act, putative marriage is
recognized as conferring spousal status under a provision defining wife,
husband, widow and widower. It provides that if the couple at issue are
not under state law "validly married," a cohabitant
shall nevertheless be deemed to be the wife, husband, widow, or
widower, as the case may be . . . if such applicant would, under
the laws applied . . . in determining the devolution of intestate
personal property have the same status with respect to the taking
of such property as a wife, husband, widow or widower of such
insured individual.'0 6
If a cohabitant were to acquire under his contract the personal prop-
erty of a deceased cohabitant, it would not be because of "status," and
there would be no "devolution" of the property. The law applied to pass
the property to the survivor would be contract law, not succession law.
That this passage of the Social Security Act relates to putative mar-
riage and not contract-based cohabitation is also clear from the subsec-
tion immediately following. It allows a putative spouse, in states not
qualifying him to take personalty by intestate succession, to obtain spousal
benefits under a federal law of putative marriage on a showing that the
applicant "in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with" the
insured and then cohabited with the insured."'
III. CREATING A POSITIVE STATUS
A. Common-Law Marriage Should Be Adopted in States Not
Recognizing This Institution
Fourteen American jurisdictions continue to recognize common-law
marriage.0 8 This doctrine makes a lawful marriage (with all of the rights
105. See Chambers v. Harris, 687 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1982) (CW, mother of deceased
insured CM's child, denied Social Security Act mother's benefits because Marvin type ar-
rangement did not create status of heir.).
Lathrope, supra note 19, at 291-92, notes the few passages of the Social Security Act
that recognize a common-law marriage (based on a holding out by the couple as having
marital status) for purposes of entitlement to benefits even though applicable state law does
not recognize common law marriage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(1)(B), 1382(c)(d)(1)(2) (1983).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1983).
107. Id. § 416(h)(1)(B).
108. F. Kuchler, Law of Engagement and Marriage 3 (2d ed. 1978), lists the following
as accepting the doctrine: Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.
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and obligations attached to a marriage created by formal and licensed
ceremony) out of cohabitation if the parties agree between themselves to
be married, hold themselves out to the community as married, and live
together some substantial period of time.' 9 It is generally held that the
agreement between the couple to marry can be inferred from their
conduct.'"
Although now recognized in a minority of jurisdictions, common-law
marriage formerly had widespread acceptance.' The move toward
legislative abolition of common-law marriage in the early part of this cen-
tury reflected two primary considerations." 2 First, the doctrine was thought
to generate litigation and encourage perjured testimony" 3 about an agree-
109. See, e.g., Freiburghaus v. Freiburghaus, 103 Idaho 679, 651 P.2d 944 (App. 1982);
In re Foster, 77 Idaho 26, 287 P.2d 282 (1955); Estate of Stinchcomb, 674 P.2d 26 (Okla.
1983) (clear and convincing evidence needed); Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982) (evidence is "closely scrutinized"). Mere temporary visitors in a state
recognizing the doctrine are unable to effectuate a common-law marriage under local law.
See Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1954). See generally Note, Common Law
Marriage: What It Is and How to Prove It, 12 S.C.L.Q. 355 (1960).
110. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 P.2d 356 (1982).
111. Most early decisions followed acceptance of the doctrine in New York in Fenton
v. Reed, 4 Johns 52 (1809). The Supreme Court in Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1878)
(enactment of licensing scheme did not impliedly abrogate common-law marriage doctrine)
declared the doctrine to be favored by public policy.
112. See generally H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States §
2.4 (1968); National College of the State Judiciary, Family Law 10-13 (1972); Stein, Com-
mon Law Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. Fain. L. 271
(1970). See also 0. Koegel, Common Law Marriage and Its Development in the United
States (1922).
Statutes abolishing the doctrine, with date of original enactment, include: Alaska Stat.
§ 25.05.011 (1917); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-111 (1913); Ark. Stat. § 55-201 (1875); Cal. Civ.
Code § 4100 (1895); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46-3 (1902); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.211 (1968);
Haw. Laws § 572-1 (1872); Burns' Ind. Stat. § 44-111 (1958); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.020
(1892); La. Digest of 1808 bk. 1, tit. II, art. 88; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.2 (1957);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.01 (1941); Miss. Code § 93-1-15 (1956); Vernon's Mo. Stat. Ann.
§ 451.040 (1939); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-104 (1922); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 122.010 (1943); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 34:1-10 (1939); N.M. Stats. § 40-1-1 (1862); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51.1 (1871);
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-01 (1890); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 106.041 (1965); S.D. Code § 14.0101
(1959); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-420 (1937); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (1898); Va. Code §
20-13 (1919); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.04.070 (1881), 26.04.140 (1939); W. Va. Code
§ 48-1-5 (1849).
In some instances the statute confirmed a common-law rejection of the doctrine by the
courts. See In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934).
Case law rejection of the doctrine is illustrated by Owens v. Bentley, 40 Del. 512, 14
A.2d 391 (1940); Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 87 A.2d 403 (1952); Dunbarton
v. Franklin, 19 N.H. 257 (1848); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. I, 33 A. 829 (1895); In re
Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492 (1943). See also 1943-1944 Me. Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 105.
113. See In re Wagner's Estate, 398 Pa. 531, 195 A.2d 495, 497 (1960). See also Com-
ment, Common-Law Marriage in Oklahoma, 14 Okla. L. Rev. 291 (1961); Kirkpatrick,
Common-Law Marriages: Their Common Law Basis and Present Need, 6 St. Louis L.J.
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ment to marry by a cohabitant seeking the benefits of lawful marriage
at the termination (either by death of the other cohabitant or by the
couple's parting) of the relationship. Secondly, it was urged that the need
for the doctrine had disappeared.' Its purpose was to legitimate cohabita-
tion by a couple seeking to marry lawfully who lived so far from the
county seat that travel by horseback to the courthouse to obtain a license
would be long and difficult and perhaps at some times of year even im-
possible due to road and weather conditions." '
The contemporary need for recognizing common-law marriage is quite
different. It has been shown that a contract by cohabitants to establish
between themselves property and support rights and obligations similar
to those of married persons either is void (under the negative-status ap-
proach to cohabitation) or fails to achieve the benefits accorded the law-
fully married under federal taxation, bankruptcy, and welfare law. Never-
theless, there will be some couples who are unaware of the invalidity of
the contract or of the unfavorable treatment given to contractual
cohabitants by federal law. Their expectations would be realized if the
common-law marriage doctrine were recognized.
Fear that revival of the common-law marriage doctrine will encourage
litigation and even perjury is a pertinent policy consideration only in states
using the negative-status approach, for in other states the cohabitant who
would assert common-law marriage can and will assert the same agree-
ment upon which common-law marriage is founded as a Marvin-style
claim.' 6 Actually, the enticement to give perjured testimony would be
decreased in most Marvin states by the recognition of common-law mar-
riage, since under that doctrine the cohabitant does not have to try to
convince the trier of fact that sharing of sexual favors was not part of
30 (1960-61); Note, Common-Law Marriage: A Legal Anachronism, 32 Ind. L.J. 99 (1956);
Atkins v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (regretting need for further eviden-
tiary proceedings in claim made as common-law wife for Social Security Act widow's benefits
after hearing officer misunderstood state law).
An interesting case where protracted litigation involved using the doctrine against a common-
law spouse is United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1983). The defendant was
convicted of fraudulently obtaining federal welfare benefits by claiming the status of widow
of a deceased husband despite having remarried through the common-law marriage doc-
trine. If there was perjury here, it was the defendant's assertion that she and her cohabitant
had not agreed to be married.
114. See generally Madison, Marital and Nonmarital Relationships: The Right to Alter-
native Lifestyles, 11 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189, 195-98 (1979-80); Note, Common-Law
Marriage and Unmarried Cohabitation: An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 579 (1978).
115. See Douthwaite, Introduction to Unmarried Couples, supra note 65, at 3, 10.
116. See Glendon, supra note 18, at 688 (Popular acceptance of cohabitation as a lifestyle
greatly increases amount of litigation concerning rights of cohabitants since the parties are
unashamed to publicize their relationship.).
1984] 1707
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the consideration for the contract. Under common-law marriage sex is
supposed to be at the heart of the consideration.
In times past undoubtedly some couples who were cohabiting and did
not intend to be married nevertheless held themselves out to the public
as married persons."I7 They did so undoubtedly to avoid the stigma and
social disapproval cast on cohabitants. It seems likely that such a holding
out resulted sometimes in a judgment decreeing a common-law marriage
that fastened life-long support and other obligations on a cohabitant who
had not in fact agreed to them.
This problem-legal overkill by fastening the common-law marriage
doctrine on persons outside its scope according to their own
understanding-should be minimal today. Cohabitation has become ac-
ceptable in most parts of the country. CM and CW often will have no
reason to hold themselves out as married when they are not. This accep-
tance will not always be the case, the writer concedes. Some potential
employers will not hire a cohabitant; some landlords will not rent to
cohabitants; and hence cohabitants who have not agreed to undertake the
property and support obligations of the lawfully married will make
representations of marital status.
On the other hand, if the law adopts the suggestion of this article
to create a new status of lawful cohabitation for persons who agree to
support and property obligations less demanding that those arising out
of lawful marriage, the stigma that may presently lead to false represen-
tations of marital status should largely vanish. Moreover, laws in many
jurisdictions prohibit discrimination in employment and sometimes in rent-
ing of property based on marital status. Since the proposed new status
is to be a form of marriage, such anti-discrimination laws should be ap-
plicable to lawful cohabitants.
Of course, common-law marriage is under federal law of taxation,
bankruptcy, and entitlements the equivalent of formal, ceremonial mar-
riage. Thus revival of the doctrine will create benefits that contract law
cannot now achieve. In sum, there is good reason to revive common-law
marriage, and only in states presently employing the negative-status ap-
proach to cohabitation-an unacceptable alternative in this writer's view-
will doing so increase litigation and invite perjured claims.
B. The Putative Marriage Doctrine Should Be Fully Accepted
A number of states apply the civil effects of the status of lawful mar-
117. See Succession of Lannes, 187 La. 17, 37, 174 So. 94, 102 (1936) (dissenting opin-
ion) (asserting that it was at that time inconceivable that a male cohabitant would ever
introduce his female partner to a friend or relative as his concubine, claiming that he would
instead hold her out to be his wife).
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riage to a cohabitant who believed in good faith that she was married
when in fact an impediment rendered the anticipated marriage void. ' 8
If one of the parties to the putative marriage has a lawful spouse living
at the same time of cohabitation in putative marriage, it may be impossi-
ble to accord all of the civil effects of marriage to a putative spouse.
Both the lawful and the putative spouse of CM may not, for example,
be able to have full inheritance rights of a lawful spouse. In community
property states both lawful spouse and putative spouse cannot claim own
half the earnings of their common husband or wife without stripping him
or her of any interest in such earnings, an unfair result if the common
spouse attempted to remarry in good faith belief that the prior marriage
had terminated. In these cases of multiple spouses, the law of putative
marriage does the best it can to do equity." 9
In some states, such as Louisiana,' 20 the putative marriage doctrine
applies only if the couple obtained a license and went through a formal
ceremony. The writer suspects this limitation could be traced back to con-
tinental civil law jurisdictions where the Roman Catholic Church had
greater influence on marriage law than any religion presently has in the
United States. In this country, a majority of states at one time recog-
nized common-law marriage and, as noted, fourteen jurisdictions still do.
It is not unreasonable, then, for a couple living in Louisiana to believe
that common-law marriage is recognized and attempt to contract for a
common-law marriage. The nonrecognition of that doctrine logically could
be the impediment to lawful marriage that would confer putative spouse
status on both parties. Concededly, this would be an indirect way for
the judicial branch to adopt the common-law marriage doctrine for a small
118. See La. Civ. Code arts. 117-118. In other states the doctrine emerges from a piecing
together of various statutes and cases in a jurisdiction dealing issue by issue with putative
marriage. See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 98-99. For example, see Williams v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 670 P.2d 453 (Colo. App. 1983) (putative spouse recovers worker
compensation benefits, -applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-110).
If both parties to the invalid marriage are aware of the invalidity, both will have to turn
to the Marvin doctrine or some other approach than putative marriage for relief. But see
In re Marriage of Recknor, 138 Cal. App. 3d 539, 187 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1982), where CM,
aware that CW was married to someone else, asked her to go through a ceremony with
him; not wanting to do so, she finally yielded to his importuning. The court held that
he was estopped to deny the validity of the marriage. (Whether she, too, was so estopped
was not decided.) This was certainly not estoppel in pais, for CW had as full knowledge
of the facts and law as did CM and also suffered no detriment by going through the ceremony.
It is clear on the face of the opinion that CW was not "ignorant of the truth" 138 Cal.
App. 3d at 546, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 892 as the Recknor court conceded she should be for
a true estoppel to arise.
119. See, e.g., Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974); Prince
v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956); Routh v. Rough, 57 Tex. 589, 602 (1882)
(concurring opinion).
120. Succession of Donohue, 389 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (citing Succession
of Marinoni, 183 La. 770, 164 So. 797 (1935)).
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number of couples, but it is logically sound and is accepted in some
states. 2I
Parties to a putative marriage (even if one of them is not in good
faith) have almost certainly made an express contract to undertake the
support and property obligations inter se of those lawfully married. Where
such an express agreement cannot be found, surely one must be implied-
in-fact from the attempt to marry. Express or implied, the contract can
be enforced in Marvin jurisdictions even by a cohabitant who was not
in good faith (i.e., he knew a prior marriage had not been dissolved).
As has been seen, however, under federal law, recognition of these
rights by way of status rather than contract law is much more favorable
to the parties. As indicated, the Social Security Act recognizes a putative
spouse as having a marital status."2 The Tax Court has held that support
payments ordered by a court annulling an invalid marriage are alimony
for purposes of deduction by the payor and taxability for the recipient." 3
This view necessarily recognizes that at least for tax purposes, marital
status is not necessarily dependent on a lawful marriage and that judge-
made rules creating an equivalent status can serve as the foundation for
the status required for the favorable treatment given married persons under
federal law.
Some states apply only a portion of the civil effects of lawful mar-
riage in favor of a good faith putative spouse. In California, for exam-
ple, sharing of gains similar to that under community property laws can
be asserted," ' but the putative spouse cannot inherit purely separate prop-
121. Wagner v. County of Imperial, 145 Cal. App. 3d 980, 193 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1983)
(allowing putative wife under common law marriage theory to sue for wrongful death of
"husband"); Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 272, 251 P.2d 67 (1952).
122. See supra note 106. The undefined terms spouse and widow in the provision of
the federal Civil Service Act providing for annuity death benefits to a surviving spouse
have been construed to include a putative spouse where state law recognized such status.
Brown v. Devine, 574 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1983). However, a few federal courts have
not been so charitable in dealing with equally vague references to spouses and widows under
some other acts of Congress. Sometimes putative spouses have not fared so well, usually
because of courts' imputing to Congress an intent to exclude them from benefits notwith-
standing a status created by state law that closely resembles that arising out of lawful mar-
riage. See Lawson v. United States, 192 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951) (no benefits for putative
spouse under Death on High Seas Act). Contra E.W. Coslett & Sons, Inc. v. Bowman,
354 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1973) (allowed recovery
under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, relying on state law to
determine validity of the marriage).
123. Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457, 460 (1974) (holding that "under New
York law the putative marriage between Andrew and Barbara was recognized for purposes
of creating a legal obligation upon Andrew to support his wife"). The "marriage" was
bigamous and wholly void under New York law relating to actual marriage. Apparently
both parties did not realize that the ex parte Nevada divorce Barbara's first husband had
obtained was invalid; thus, they had the good faith requisite for putative spouse status.
124. See Cal. Civ. Code § 4452 (West 1983).
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erty of a deceased cohabitant as a lawful spouse could." 5 And it has been
said in dictum that a putative spouse lacks the status of a lawful spouse
under an insurance policy extending coverage to. a named insured's hus-
band or wife.' 26
California's refusal to treat a putative marriage like a lawful mar-
riage for several purposes is the only logical explanation of a decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that
support ordered to be paid by a putative spouse at annullment was
dischargeable in bankruptcy.' 27 The court's declaration that only a lawful
marriage'28 could create a nondischargeable support obligation seems overly
broad and certainly cannot be squared with the Tax Court's acceptance
of a tax deduction for the payor of alimony ordered by a court granting
annulment.
On the other hand, California's denial of inheritance rights to a
putative wife supports an argument that the status cast by California law
on the putative wife is so far removed from marriage that it should not
be considered marriage for bankruptcy law purposes. (The same conclu-
sion should logically extend to tax law.)
The writer sees no reason for mere partial acceptance of the putative
marriage doctrine. A question arises, however, whether it should be ex-
tended so that, if only one "spouse" has the good faith necessary for
putative status, the other party to the union-the one without the good
faith-nevertheless obtains the benefits of the putative marriage doctrine.
125. Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975). However, under
In re Krone's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948), the putative spouse can
inherit intestate all of what would have been community property in a lawful marriage,
including the half that would have been owned by the other party to the union. Levie and
Krone are logically irreconcilable.
126. Menchaca v. Hiatt, 59 Cal. App. 3d 117, 127, 130 Cal. Rptr. 607, 613 (1976).
On a majority of issues, however, California does treat a putative spouse the same as a
lawfully married person. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377 (West Supp. 1984) (putative spouse
can sue for wrongful death of other party); Brennfleck v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
3 Cal. App. 3d 666, 84 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970) (Putative spouse gets worker compensation
benefits at least if no lawful spouse exists.); Adduddell v. Board of Administration, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970) (Putative spouse is "widow" who receives death
benefits under statutory pension plan at least if no lawful spouse exists.).
127. Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963) (criticized in Comment, Putative
Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 96, 105 &
passim (1977). In Norris, a California annulment court had ordered the "husband" in a
bigamous marriage to pay $2408.00 at $35 per week to the "wife" to settle property rights.
The court did not rest its holding of nondischargeability squarely on the apparent purpose
of the state court order: not to provide support btit to divide property.
128. The court said that the support obligation had to be founded on a "natural and
legal duty." But the status created by California law was "natural and legal"-it simply
did not extend to the putative wife as many benefits as did the state's law concerning actual
marriage. Norris, 324 F.2d at 828.
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With respect to property rights at annulment, one California decision has
reached this result as a matter of statutory interpretation. '29 The writer
disagrees with that court's construction of the statute at issue; 3 he also
sees no need for both parties to the relationship to have the same status.
One obvious purpose of the putative marriage doctrine is to extend to
the good faith spouse the benefits she reasonably expected from the rela-
tionship (as well as the burdens' 3 ). The party without good faith belief
in the marriage should not reasonably expect all of the benefits of a lawful
marriage, but he could obtain the status of lawful cohabitant while the
party with good faith belief in the marriage obtained the status of putative
spouse.
C. Total Assimilation Should Be Rejected
Recent decisions in two states apparently have in effect attached the
status of lawful marriage to cohabiting couples having a long-term, stable
relationship.'32 At least at an inter vivos termination of the relationship
129. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), overruled
on other grounds, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976). The Marvin court said it "need not now resolve" the question of the correctness
of this aspect of the Cary holding. 18 Cal. 3d at 681 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.18.
130. California Civil Code § 4452 states that if the "court finds that either party or
both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court should declare
such party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and . . . shall divide, in
accordance with Section 4800, i.e., 50-50] that property acquired during the union .... "
Cal. Civ. Code § 4452 (West 1983) (emphasis added). Cary emphasized the Civil Code sec-
tion 4800 directive to divide 50-50, coupled with the absence of any disclaimer of the ap-
plicability of that approach when the property at issue was acquired by the good faith spouse
and a bad faith party would take half on the division. The writer's view is that the legislature
would not by way of the language emphasized above acknowledge that only one spouse
might have putative status if both were in all instances to be treated the same way under
the statute. Accord Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 Calif.
L. Rev. 937, 947-52 (1977).
131. See Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147 (1905) (Putative wife could
not disaffirm contract due to her minority as she could have had she had no type of marital
status at time of contracting.); In re Koonce, 380 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980)
(Putative husband after annulment could not disaffirm adoption of "wife's" children dur-
ing the relationship even though done under special proceedings available only to "spouse"
of adopting child's parent.).
132. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984); Warden
v. Warden, 10 Fain. L. Rptr. 1259 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1984); Eaton v. Johnston,
9 Kan. App. 2d 63, 672 P.2d 10 (1983). California at one time also employed this ap-
proach. See In Re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973),
overruled, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
See also Finlay, supra note 54, at 156, 157 (Australia is close to using a total assimilation
approach.).
A strong advocate of what comes close to total assimilation for cohabitants under a status
law approach is Blumberg, supra note 46. For most purposes, Professor Blumberg would
treat cohabitants in a stable relationship the same as the lawfully married, see, e.g., id.
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(quasi-divorce), this approach achieves a total assimilation of cohabitants
into the law governing the lawfully married. The logic of the decisions
should extend to issues arising at termination of the relationship by death
and, probably, to issues arising while the relationship is on going. This
total assimilation approach goes far beyond the common-law marriage
doctrine, for it recognizes the marriage status without a contract to be
married and, apparently, without the holding out of the couple to the
public as being married. The writer finds this total assimilation approach
unacceptable from a public policy standpoint.
When the cohabitants have taken care not to represent to each other
or to the public that they have the status of the lawfully married, their
expectations concerning the benefits and burdens arising out of the rela-
tionship should be different from those attached to the lawful marriage
status. Most likely one or both of the parties who are cohabiting without
a holding out of marital status declines to assume the primary burden
of marriage-a life-long support obligation. Probably, too, one or both
of such cohabitants is purposefully avoiding a legal status that can be
terminated only through adversary legal proceedings (divorce) that are often
quite costly (with the husband often ending up having to pay not only
his own attorney's fees but those of his wife as well). 33
When only one of the cohabitants has such objections, the other must
be aware at least in general that her mate is declining to accept the status
of marriage. She has no reasonable expectations to be dashed when the
law in response does not fix the status of lawfully married on the couple.
The law could take the position that those who want a sexual rela-
tionship have to pay for it, and that the cost is a life-long support obliga-
tion plus entanglement in costly divorce proceedings. But what is to be
gained? The writer cannot see how morality is advanced by the law's tell-
ing a couple that it will treat them as married even though they do not
want to be. The fact remains that this type of cohabiting couple is known
in the community to have a sexual relationship while deliberately refusing
to marry. Whatever affront to marriage results surely cannot be even
substantially eliminated by a rule of law that treats them as married
anyway. To foist on the couple the status of marriage as a punishment
for their lifestyle is itself a greater affront to formal marriage.
at 1167 (inheritance rights at dissolution of cohabitation relationship by death), although
for some purposes she would want proof of a two-year union or birth of a child (see,
e.g., id. at 1158-59) (treating cohabitants the same as the lawfully married for income tax
purposes).
133. The unfairness of saddling one or both cohabitants with all of the burdens of lawful
marriage when he or they deliberately declined to marry in order to avoid such burdens
has been often noted. See, e.g., M. Freeman & C. Lyon, Cohabitation Without Marriage
51-54, 183-85 (1983); Clark, supra note 26; Casad, supra note 4, at 55; Finlay, supra note
54, at 159-60; Hunter, supra note 4, at 1094; Schultz, supra note 19, at 287; Simitian,
supra note 50, at 7, 10; Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 266; Note, supra note 18, at 370.
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The total assimilation approach is thus unacceptable. It is as wrong
to impose the status of lawfully married on a couple seeking to avoid
marriage as to imply in such a case a contract under which the pair agree
to all of the benefits and burdens of lawful marriage.
D. Ad Hoc Extension of Particular Benefits and Burdens of Marriage
Is an Insufficient Remedy
A number of jurisdictions have judicially or legislatively'34 picked out
certain aspects of the status of lawful marriage and affixed them as a
matter of status, not contract law, to certain types of cohabitants. Thus,
a cause of action for loss of consortium has been held in two cases (with
many others to the contrary) to be available to one cohabitant when the
other has been injured.'35 A right to recover statutory death benefits under
a worker's compensation scheme has also twice been extended to a
cohabitant.'36 The right to receive alimony'37 or to inherit property at
death'38 is affixed to some cohabitation relationships by a small number
of statutes. With respect to most issues, however, the courts refuse to
treat cohabitation as creating a status similar to marriage.' 39 To date, so
134. Many of the legislative examples are surveyed in Unmarried Couples, supra note
115, ch. 6.
135. See Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983)
(recovery allowed if relationship is "stable and significant"); Bulloch v. United States, 487
F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (repudiated subsequently by, state court decisions cited below).
Contra Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977); Lieding v. Com-
mercial Diving Center, 143 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1983); Etienne v. DKM
Enterprises, Inc., 136 Cal. App. 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982); Hendrix v. General Motors,
146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983) (hearing granted, appeal dism'd); Curry
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 577 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Felch v. Air Florida, 562
F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1983) (applying Florida law); Leonardis v. Morton Chemical Co.,
184 N.J. Super. 10, 445 A,.2d 45 (1982).
136. See infra note 140 for cases from California and Louisiana.
137. N.S. Rev. Stat. ch. 341, § I (right to reasonable support after one year of cohabita-
tion); B.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 §§ 1, 74 (right arises after two years); Ont. Rev. Stat. ch.
152, §§ 1, 14, 52 (after five years or birth of child in relationship of "some permanence").
138. See H. Hahlo, supra note 43, at 50 (discussing Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 488, § 57, suc-
cession rights based on need for certain categories of cohabitants); M. Freeman & C. Lyon,
supra note 133, at 79-80 (discussing English law's provision for a lump sum family allowance
at death for a dependent surviving cohabitant).
139. The benefits of a married person were denied to a cohabitant in the following
situations:
Emotional distress recovery: Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1980) (CW is stranger to CM, unable to recover in tort as could a lawful wife observing
him killed).
Prison visitation: In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1104, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826
(1982) (cohabitant not member of prisoner's "immediate family" entitled to visit).
Spousal privilege of evidence law: People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr.
422 (1979); In re Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (CW subpoenaed to testify
before grand jury investigating CM).
Taxation: Estate of Edgett, 111 Cal. App. 3d 230, 168 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1980) (for in-
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far as the writer knows, no jurisdiction has extended more than one benefit
of lawful marriage to cohabitants as a matter of status law.' 40
By using status rather than contract law, this ad hoc assimilation ap-
proach has the benefit of more certainty. If a long-term cohabitation can
be shown, the benefits and burdens attach automatically without concern
about a taint of sexual consideration or what inferences concerning inten-
tion of the parties are to be drawn from their conduct. Presumably, only
an express contract between the pair to avoid the aspect of lawful mar-
riage which the jurisdiction attaches to cohabitants would be effective to
avoid that result.
The primary difficulty with this approach to sorting out the legal rights
of cohabitants is its crudeness. With respect to each issue, the law's
choice-at least if the ad hoc assimilation is judicial-is "all or nothing."
The court either leaves the cohabiting couple with respect to the matter
at issue (e.g., loss of consortium) under the "no rights" posture of the
traditional negative-status approach, or it applies to the couple all of the
law concerning the issue drawn from the status of lawful marriage. (While
legislatures have the power to take a "middle ground" approach while
dealing with the rights of cohabitants on an issue-by-issue basis, they
seldom have done so.)
Yet another problem with the ad hoc assimilation approach is that
it may take decades for the courts of a jurisdiction (with or without help
heritance tax purposes CW was class "C" stranger, not class "A" spouse, substantially
increasing the tax liability).
Wrongful death recovery: Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft, 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1982); Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1981); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1982).
Unemployment Benefits: Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 663
P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, (1983) (CW's quitting work to follow CM's move out of
state not "good cause" as it would have been were the pair married).
140. The closest case for multiple benefits is in Louisiana, where a cohabitant because
of her status can recover workers' compensation benefits. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978). It was recently held that a cohabitant also should be treated
as an insured's "spouse" under a group life insurance policy, see Jackson v. Continental
Cas. Co., 412 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1982). In dictum the court said it could see no basis for
distinguishing for insurance status purposes a concubine from a lawful wife. The narrow
holding rested on an incontestability clause in the policy, however.
In California the status of cohabitant qualifies a party (even in a same-sex union) for
worker compensation benefits under a statutory scheme. Donovan v. Workers' Comp. App.
Bd., 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982); Department of Indus. Relations
v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 7 Cal. Fam. L. Rptr. 2144 (1st Dist. June 14, 1979).
As noted above, in California there is a split of authority concerning recovery for loss
of consortium with the "no's" having a big edge, see supra note 108. See also Hess v.
Fair Empl. & Housing Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982) (A
cohabiting couple recovered damages when a potential landlord refused to rent to them
because they were not married. But that they were cohabiting in a sexual relationship did
not advance their recovery, which was based on a statute barring discrimination against
all persons on the basis of their not being married.).
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from the legislature) to provide the answer with respect to each of scores
of legal issues that may arise (such as availability of the marital privilege
of evidence law, applicability of the "necessaries" doctrine of contract
law, and method for determining the domicile of CW).' 41 Meanwhile, as
the jurisdiction attaches to cohabitants more and more of the benefits
and burdens of lawful marriage, the cohabitants' posture under federal
law of taxation, bankruptcy and welfare will become murky. Much litiga-
tion will be necessary to determine whether a sufficient number of rules
of lawful marriage have been affixed to cohabitation so that federal law
should view the couple as married.
E. The Legislature Should Enact a Comprehensive Bill Creating a New
Status of Lawful Cohabitation
1.The New Status Should Be Denominated a Form of Marriage
If contract law, total assimilation, and ad hoc assimilation are inef-
fective remedies for dealing with the rights and obligations of cohabitants,
only one course appears to remain: recognition of a new status. Avoidance
of the ad hoc approach requires that this result be achieved legislatively.
What is needed is a thorough study culminating in a bill that covers all,
or at least all significant, legal issues that can arise with respect to the
rights of the cohabitants inter se and in interaction with third parties.
With each issue the legislature has three choices: (1) create no rights; (2)
borrow fully from the law applicable to the lawfully married; and (3)
create a new rule tailored for the new status (usually imposing a lesser
obligation than that arising under the status of lawfully married).
It is important that the legislation specifically declare the new status
to be a form of marriage, since so much of the federal law conditions
the granting of benefits on the existence of such a status. Of course, the
mere declaration by the legislature that the new status is a form of mar-
riage will not be binding on the federal government in administering tax,'4 '
bankruptcy and welfare laws; however, the state law reform will extend
a considerable amount of the law applicable to the lawfully married to
cohabitants, and the writer believes the intention of the legislature that
the new law be treated as matter of marriage law reform would carry
weight with federal courts and agencies.
141. Concerning such delay, see Finlay, supra note 54, at 166.
142. See Lathrope, supra note 19. Until very recently the IRS routinely deferred to the
state law of marital status in applying the tax code, see, e.g., id. at 272, 278. When couples
began obtaining year-end divorces (followed by quick remarriages) in order to avoid the
marriage penalty, the IRS asserted that the divorces were shams as a matter of federal
tax law without regard to whether the parties' domiciliary state would recognize the divorce
as temporarily ending marital status. See id. at 278 & passim; see also Bruch, supra note
26, at 129 (noting that the IRS may not follow state's characterization of nature of relief
given to spouse at dissolution).
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The assumption here is that the legislature will agree with the writer
that, to the extent the law imposes support obligations under the new
status, it is wise social policy not to have them dischargeable in bankruptcy,
and that, to the extent the cohabitants because of their status share in
a community of gains, the full tax-law benefits of such sharing, as well
as other tax benefits accorded the lawfully married, should be available." 3
Meshing federal welfare law with the new status will not be so easy but
can be done. For example, a lawful CW should not be able to obtain
social security benefits as a divorced wife for any period longer than CM's
support obligation exists (a maximum two years under this proposal, as
explained later in this article).
It may be of interest that the most difficult problem the writer has
faced in preparing this article is what to call the new status. He has opted
for "lawful cohabitation" as a temporary measure and hopes that some-
one else will succeed where he has failed in the matter of nomenclature.
Although the reform bill must for federal law purposes declare the
new status to be an aspect of marriage law, use of a term including the
word marriage (the writer had considered demi-marriage) probably has
to be rejected if the legislation has accepted the proposal to revive or
enact common-law marriage. The cohabitants must not call each other
husband and wife nor refer to themselves as married, or else they will
probably end up being married under this scheme.
The ideal nomenclature would accommodate formal invitations to at-
tend a ceremony creating the status and society page announcements as
well as introductions ("I'd like you to meet Joe, my lawful cohabitant"
simply will not do.)."'
2. Both Formalized and Common-Law Forms of the New Status
Should be Recognized
A couple who wish to enter into the new status should be able to
do so immediately by filing a formal document of union that would be
recorded like a certificate of lawful marriage. Probably the same restric-
tions on lawful marriage would have to be carried over to the new status,
i.e., the rules on age of consent, permissible degree of consanguinity, and
mental capacity should not be different for persons seeking to become
143. But see the Virgin Islands Vesper Marriage Act of 1981, V.1. Code Ann. tit. 16,
§§ 81-86 (Supp. 1982-1983). This unique form of marriage is limited to persons aged 60
and older. It is an "easy out" type marriage in that during the first year of the status
either party can terminage the relationship by simplying filing a notice with the local court
clerk and, after such year, by a notice of termination executed by both spouses. Id. at
§ 85. The act provides that "[f]or purpose of taxation and the receipt of pension benefits,
parties to a vesper marriage shall be considered and treated as single persons as though
they had not entered into the marriage contract." Id. at § 84(c).
144. See Lorio, supra note 4, at 1; Folberg & Buren, supra note 18, at 353 n.2.
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lawful cohabitants rather than husband and wife. With respect to at least
one present requirement of marriage law-that the union be
heterosexual-closer legislative scrutiny is called for. 141 Since child-bearing
may not be intended by many cohabitants, blood tests required of marry-
ing couples for the purpose of detecting procreation problems rather than
disease might be dispensed with.
No matter how easy the law makes it formally to enter the new status,
many couples will simply begin living together and, at some point, should
be governed by the new status law. Thus the reform legislation should
include a "common-law" form of lawful cohabitation under which the
status automatically attaches. This status could attach in a brief period
of time if the couple contracted to be lawful cohabitants and held
themselves out publicly as such. In other situations, the relationship could
be converted from a non-status sexual sharing to lawful cohabitation after
a period of time-six months, one year, two years"6-specified in the
statute and applicable to relationships where no contract was made and/or
no holding out occurred.
The cohabitants should be free to avoid entering into the status and
to continue a non-status living arrangement beyond the specified period.
Since one of the main reasons for moving from the reliance on contract-
based remedies under Marvin to status law is avoidance of uncertainty,
only an express contract to avoid lawful cohabitation status should be
effective; i.e., if the statutory period was one year and the sexual cohabita-
tion extended beyond a year, a party to the union should not be able
to avoid the obligations of the status by urging a contrary implied-in-fact
agreement between the couple.
The legislature should consider making the status-at least for some
purposes-retroactive to the date when cohabitation began. Such retroac-
tivity may be especially appropriate for determining acquisitions falling
into the community of gains that in some states will be an aspect of the
new status. For couples who do not contract to be lawful cohabitants
while holding themselves out as such, the law withholds attaching the status
for a year (or other period) because of uncertainty as to the nature of
the relationship. The passage of time removes the uncertainty and makes
it at least not unreasonable for the law to say with certainty that this
was from the outset a status-based cohabitation and not just a non-status
sexual arrangement.
145. See the final paragraphs of this article.
146. See Finlay, supra note 54, at 163, noting that in countries other than the United
States, statutes dealing on an ad hoc (i.e., limited issue) basis with cohabitants have fixed




3. Dissolution of the Status Should Be Quick and Should Avoid
Costly Procedures
The writer has noted that one of the main reasons that persons choose
to cohabit rather than marry is that one or both of the couple objects
to the costs in money, time, and emotions of divorce proceedings necessary
to dissolve a lawful marriage." 7 The new status of lawful cohabitation
will not satisfy a contemporary need unless the status can be terminated
efficiently. No more should be required than filing of a certificate of
dissolution signed by both spouses, indicating that their cohabitation has
ended and that they have agreed on terms for division of property and
for support payments. (Birth of a child to lawful cohabitants should con-
vert their union to a lawful marriage, since concern for a child's welfare
after dissolution warrants supervision by a court over the termination of
the status.)'48
If the couple filed such a document without making agreements con-
cerning property and support, the law should supply a contract for them.
The writer would recommend the waiver of support (alimony) rights and
a confirmation of property under which the form of title controls. Owner-
ship of assets having no title should go to the ex-cohabitant peaceably
taking possession, and in all other instances the couple should remain
coowners until they work out an exchange or are forced to resort to par-
tition actions.
If one cohabitant alone files a certificate of dissolution, that filing
should end the status.'49 If the pair are unable to work out property and
support claims, either CM or CW should be able to seek the aid of media-
tion, arbitration, or an informal court proceeding.' 5 ° These procedures
should be structured to keep the involvement of attorneys at a minimum.
If one cohabitant, notified that the other has filed a certificate of
dissolution, does not begin the mediation, arbitration or informal court
proceedings within a set period of time (e.g., six months), title should
vest in the property at issue according to the approach outlined above
based on title and possession.
When, as will happen not infrequently, the couple splits up with
147. Many commentators accept the notion that one important reason why one or both
cohabitants in a relationship declines to formally marry is a desire to have an "easy out"
if and when the relationship fails. See, e.g., L. Weitzman, supra note 19, at 245; Casad,
supra note 4, at 56; M. Freeman & C. Lyon, supra note 133, at 190 (citing Helby v. Rafferty,
3 All. Eng. Rpt. 1016 (1978)); Lorio, supra note 4, at 22.
148. See Glendon, supra note 33 passim (arguing that birth of a child is a basis for
total assimilation of the cohabiting couple).
149. See note 143 (Virgin Island Vesper Marriage Act).
150. See Rigby, Alternate Dispute Resolution, 44 La. L. Rev. 1325 (1984).
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neither filing a certificate of dissolution, the status of lawful cohabitation
should terminate after a short period, such as 120 days. The legislature
should consider making the termination retroactive to the date of
separation 5 ' for purposes of determining what acquisitions are coowned
under a community of gains regime.
When the status terminates by passage of time, so should property
rights-e.g., if no claims are made within the next 120 days following
120 days of separation-according to the suggested rules based on title
and possession. Support rights would be waived if not timely asserted.
4. In Community Property States Lawful Cohabitants Should Be
Subject to a Community of Gains
It is more probable than not that a couple that comes under the status
of lawful cohabitants would want to share ownership of gains by both
during their union.' 52 Thus the law should make a community of gains
an aspect of this new status. An express contract to the contrary-e.g.,
to live separate in property-should be necessary to avoid this benefit-
burden of lawful cohabitation. At present the writer can think of only
one reason that a community property state might not want to extend
its community property law in full force to the new status. An important
feature of the new status is the "easy out" termination. The states of
Louisiana, Texas, and Idaho and New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada-
which do not have a living-apart doctrine applicable to communities of
gains in lawful marriages' "-may want to borrow this feature of Califor-
nia and Washington'54 community property law for lawful cohabitants.
On the other hand, the benefits of doing so will be slight if the new legisla-
tion provides for a quick termination of the status after the couple splits
up (e.g., the 120-day period suggested above) together with a subsequent
automatic vesting of title to property based on possession and title. Ex-
151. That is, something like the living-apart doctrine of some community property states
should be adopted. See Reppy, Some suggested Revisions for a Basically Sound Uniform
Act, Houston L. Rev. (forthcoming) (1984).
152. See L. Weitzman, supra note 19, at 427 (empirical study showed 88076 of cohabitants
making formal contract opted for sharing of gains by analogy to community of property);
Blumberg, supra note 46, at 1136-37 (most couples who cohabit desire the sharing of a
community of gains).
153. See W. Reppy & C. Samuel, Community Property in the United States 289-90 (2d
ed. 1982); W. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States § 6.19 (1982).
In Arizona a form of the living-apart doctrine was accepted in Pendleton v. Brown, 24
Ariz. 604, 221 P. 213 (1923) (implied renunciation); In re Marriage of Fong, 112 Ariz.
298, 589 P.2d 1330 (App. 1978) (when "mutual will to union ceases"); but flatly rejected
in several other decisions, including Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (App.
1978); Estate of Messer, 118 Ariz. 291, 576 P.2d 150 (App. 1978).




cept in rare cases, assets earned during the 120-day period after separa-
tion will be either titled in the acquiring party or in his possession.
5. The Support Obligation of a Lawful Cohabitant Should Be Strictly
Limited
Since the life-long support obligation is probably the burden of lawful
marriage most likely to cause a cohabitant to reject marriage for an alter-
native living arrangement,' 5 5 the new status of lawful cohabitation should
handle the support obligation differently. Certainly the cohabitants should
be free to contract expressly against any support obligation, even though
the statute might impose a limited duty. 6 A legislative determination that
the basic rule would be no support obligation at all (unless agreed to
by contract) should not be faulted,' 7 but there will be situations of such
sacrifice of career opportunities by a cohabitant assuming the role of the
stay-at-home domestic that placing a limited support obligation on the
other cohabitant could be an acceptable compromise between the no-
support and the life-long-support positions.
A substantial case of equities should exist before any support obliga-
tion is engrafted on the new status. For example, the law might provide
that no cohabitant is entitled to support unless he can show at least five
years of career sacrifice because of the role played as cohabitant. Since
under this proposal the birth of a child should convert the lawful cohabita-
tion into a lawful marriage, the occasion for CW to assume a stay-at-
home domestic role as a cohabitant will not often arise.
Under no circumstances should the support obligation exceed a short,
fixed period of time such as two years. The policy here is not to make
lawful cohabitation so similar to marriage as to discourage marriage as
an institution. A further restriction, such as one based on a percentage
of net income of the obligor cohabitant, should be considered as well.
155. See L. Weitzman, supra note 19, at 365; Douthwaite, supra note 115, at 9.
156. Even for lawfully married spouses, alimony has become an unusual remedy at divorce.
It is seldom awarded, and difficulties in collecting on an award are well known. See generally
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181 (1981); see also M. Glendon,
The New Family and the New Property 54-57 (1982) (alimony rarely granted); Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change-A Study of Rhetoric
and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 795,
798, 826; Glendon, supra note 4, at 706; Skolnick, supra note 9, at 352.
157. Professor Weitzman's empirical study of the terms of express contracts made by
cohabitants showed an average duration for the relationship (when such term appeared in
the contract) of only three years. L. Weitzman, supra note 19, at 424. Apparently such
term was intended to mark the outer limit of a period of support obligation if the relation-
ship in fact terminated sooner. In other contracts that Weitzman examined, a support obliga-
tion extending beyond any termination of the relationship was waived.
19841
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
6. Other Rules of Law Attached to the New Status Should Be
Molded Based on Reasonable Wishes and Expectations of the
Cohabitants and Third Parties
Time and space do not permit examination in this article of the ap-
propriate treatment in the case of cohabitants of the multitude of issues
that can arise.'" In each legislature creating the new status should take
into account what the typical cohabiting couple would want the law to
provide, what their reasonable expectations might be, and what expecta-
tions third parties interacting with the cohabitants might have.
For example, with respect to intestate succession where one cohabi-
tant dies during the existence of the lawful cohabitation status (or at least
before the pair separates), the writer's notion is that the decedent would
have the same wishes concerning property rights of his cohabitant as would
a lawful husband concerning his wife's claim to property. If the sole policy
of intestate succession statutes is to effectuate the type of testamentary
scheme the typical decedent would voluntarily adopt, the legislature could
simply borrow for cohabitants the rules of succession applicable to couples
lawfully married.'5 9
On the strength of the moral claim by a survivor against the estate
of the decedent, however, a surviving cohabitant, who opted for a rela-
tionship from which he was effectively free to walk away with ease, could
be seen as entitled to much less than a surviving lawful spouse-perhaps
to no more than a sum equal to two years' support needs. The handling
of the right to sue for wrongful death would likely follow the approach
taken to the intestacy claim.
A lawful cohabitant, in the writer's opinion, should have no cause
of action for loss of consortium because of the "I-can-get-out-at-any-time"
nature of the relationship, but many critics may disagree with this
assessment.
CONCLUSION
The negative-status approach to cohabitation is achieving no social
policies and is needlessly frustrating freedom of choice. It should be
abandoned.
Contract law is an inadequate substitute because of uncertainty,
because of the need in many cases to litigate to determine rights of the
158. A useful survey of many of them is found in Unmarried Couples, supra note 65,
ch. 2.
159. It is to be recalled that rules concerning eligibility to become lawful cohabitants
will be the same as those for lawful marriage. Thus the lawful cohabitation relationship
cannot be bigamous and there will be no lawful widow or widower making inheritance claims
in competition with the surviving lawful cohabitant.
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parties, and because cohabitants governed by contract-based rights lose
the benefits of federal tax, bankruptcy, and welfare laws.
Some experts in domestic relations law with whom the writer has
discussed this article have said there is no need to create a new status
to solve the problem; instead, the parties to a marriage should be allowed
to freely contract to alter the legal aspects of lawful marriage, such as
by eliminating or restricting the support obligation, or by providing for
dissolution by filing of an agreement. But this "solution" would apply
in only a few cases of couples sophisticated enough to realize that the
law of marriage can be molded contractually to meet their needs.
Moreover, there is no assurance that federal law will respect the agreement.
Under this "solution," large numbers of couples will still engage in
long-term cohabitation relationships, and the law will have only the
negative-status and contract-based approaches to draw on for dealing with
them. If a positive-status approach is believed to be superior, legislation
adopting that theory can only advance the law.
The final note of this Article is about same-sex cohabiting couples.
In jurisdictions where their sexual conduct is not criminal, the negative-
status approach is just as ineffectual and inappropriate for them as for
heterosexual cohabitants, and the contract remedies just as uncertain. The
legislature should consider creating for same-sex couples a form of status
they could adopt to obtain a community of gains, intestate inheritance
rights, and the like. It would be best, however, to create this status by
separate legislation employing terminology other than that used in the
reform directed at heterosexual couples. The reason is a fear that, if the
new status extends to same-sex couples, federal courts and agencies ad-
ministering tax, bankruptcy and welfare law will conclude that, because
it can attach to same-sex couples, the new status is not a form of mar-
riage even though the legislature purports to say it is. The importance
of ensuring that the new status for heterosexual couples fits into these
areas of federal law as lawful marriage makes the risk of damage to the
proposal by including same-sex couples too great.
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